Treading On Hallowed Ground: Implications for Property Law and Critical Theory of Land Associated with Human Death and Burial by Clark, Mary L.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 94 | Issue 3 Article 3
2006
Treading On Hallowed Ground: Implications for
Property Law and Critical Theory of Land
Associated with Human Death and Burial
Mary L. Clark
American University, Washington D.C.
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Law and Race Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Clark, Mary L. (2006) "Treading On Hallowed Ground: Implications for Property Law and Critical Theory of Land Associated with
Human Death and Burial," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 94 : Iss. 3 , Article 3.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol94/iss3/3
Treading On Hallowed Ground:
Implications for Property Law and
Critical Theory of Land Associated with
Human Death and Burial
Mary L. Clark'
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the land underlying the World Trade Center
towers has come to be regarded as hallowed ground, unsuitable for private com-
mercial development. How did this happen? The land was deemed consecrated by
the deaths of nearly 3,000 people that day, including those who worked in the towers
and those who died trying to rescue them. Now considered hallowed, the land has
been taken off market and earmarked as memorial ground despite its status as some
of the most valuable real estate in the world.
In thinking about this commitment to preserve the World Trade Center towers'foot-
prints in their newly undeveloped state, this Article looks to other sites considered
consecrated (or not) through association with human death and burial and their
implications for property law and theory.
What I found is that, while basic property law rules, such as adverse possession,
dedication, and eminent domain, have been modified and solicitously applied to sites
of death and burial associated with whites, this has not been the case with death and
burial sites principally associated with non-whites.
In reflecting on this phenomenon, I considerflrst whether lands associated with death
and burial should be given special legal solicitude, concluding that they should in
light of theprofoundpersonhood interests at stake. In so doing, I build on Margaret
Jane Radin ' critical insight that property can be importantly constitutive of the
self and that the law should give special recognition to such property. I argue that
Radin ' insight applies at least as profoundly to sites of death and burial as to any
other property.
Next, I turn to critical race theory in thinking about the differential treatment of
death and burial sites associated with whites and non-whites. I conclude that, while
race is not the only reason for the difference in legal treatment, it is nevertheless
important. As such, there was nothing surprising about the seemingly indifferent
i Visiting Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law.
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and markedly inadequate governmental response to the suffering and deaths of New
Orleans' largely African American population in the immediate aftermath of Hur-
ricane Katrina.
I conclude with some thoughts on tragedies "in" the commons, specifically how modi-
fication of property law rules to recognize the consecration of land by death and
burial can bring human tragedy into the public commons of shared consciousness
and experience. The ready inclusion of white death and burial sites into the commons
and the hesitant or refused recognition of non-white death and burial sites reveals
and reflects the extent to which these lives are differently valued as a matter of both
law and culture. In the end, the failure to treat non-whites equally reverentially in
death as whites through the lesser legal and cultural solicitude granted sites associ-
ated with non-white death is a tragedy visited on our civic commons.
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EPILOGUE: DEATH AND BURIAL IN THE WAKE OF HURRICANE KATRINA
INTRODUCTION
A. Framing the question of land's consecration (or not) through
association with human death and burial
N the aftermath of September I I, 2001, the land underlying the former
WorId Trade Center towers has come to be considered hallowed ground.,
How did this happen? The land was deemed consecrated by the deaths of
nearly 3,000 people that day, including those who worked in the towers
and those who died trying to rescue them. As a consequence, the World
Trade Center towers' footprints, i.e., the land immediately underlying the
buildings, have been taken off-market, no longer thought appropriate for
private ownership, let alone commercial development. Instead, they have
been designated as a memorial, and members of Congress have petitioned
2 See, e.g., David Dunlap, A 2o-Ton Cornerstone For Freedom Tower N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2004, at § i; see also David W. Dunlap, In a Space this Sacred, Every Square Foot Counts, N.Y.
TIMS, April 29, 2004, at B3. Their deaths have also been honored in other formats, including
the New York Philharmonic's "On the Transmigration of Souls," composed by John Adams
(200i-o2). See Lawrence Van Gelder, National Broadcast for Grammy Winner, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
15, 2005, at E2.
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for national historic landmark status, relying on the land's perceived conse-
cration to preserve it undeveloped in perpetuity.3
The extraordinary nature of the widespread agreement not to rebuild
on the footprints cannot be overstated given the land's status as some of the
most valuable real estate in the world (at least pre-September I Ith) and
given New York's famously fractious political environment where agree-
ment on anything, especially something as significant in meaning and con-
sequence as this, is rare indeed. In the end, the commitment not to rebuild
on the footprints represents a decommodification of once highly prized
commercial property 4 and a reinfusion of it into the "commons" for use as
a public memorial.
In reflecting on the largely undisputed commitment to preserve the
World Trade Center footprints in memory of those who died there, I began
thinking about other ways in which property, specifically real property, i.e.,
land and fixtures on land,6 has or has not been recognized as consecrated
through association with human death and burial, 7 and what consequences
3 See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
4 In using the term "decommodification," I reference Margaret Jane Radin's writings
on the process by which we, as a legal and social culture, agree that certain "things," such as
babies or bodies, should be placed beyond the reach of the market. See, e.g., Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienabiliy, ioo HARv. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (developing her commodification/
decommodification argument).
5 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243-48
(expressing concern for consequences of lack of incentives for maintaining property found in
the public "commons").
6 See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (2d ed. 191o).
7 There are a number of other significant ways in which land may come to be consid-
ered "sacred," humanistically understood (see INTRODUCTION, part B, infra). While beyond the
scope of this paper's detailed analysis, two other ways in which land is deemed consecrated
are land's embrace by the environmental preservationists and/or conservationists, and land's
association with birth, newborns, and the home.
A. The Environmental Movement's Embrace of the "Sacred" Nature of Land
Environmental preservationists and conservationists have been inspired, at least in part, by in-
timations, or perceived reflections, of the sacred in nature. For some environmentalists, nature
is a reflection of the cosmic plan. See EMILE DURKHEIM, ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE
82 (Karen Fields trans., zoo) ("[Tihere is one impression man cannot avoid in the presence
of nature.... That sensation of an infinite space that surrounds him, of an infinite time that
went before and will follow the present moment, of forces infinitely superior to those at his
disposal, cannot fail, it seems, to awaken inside him the idea that there is an infinite power
outside him to which he is subject."); see also MIRCEA ELIADE, ThE SACRED AND THE PROFANE
116 (Willard R. Trask trans., Harcourt, Brace, and Co. 1959) ("[Nlature is never only 'natural';
it is always fraught with a religious value. This is easy to understand, for the cosmos is a divine
creation; coming from the hands of the gods, the world is impregnated with sacredness.").
For others, the environment deserves reverence on its own terms, apart from association
with cosmic or theistic phenomena, in recognition of its beauty and pristine character. See,
e.g., JOHN MUIR: HIS LIFE AND LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS (T. Gifford ed., 1996); JOHN MUIR,
NATURE WRITINGS: THE STORY OF MY BOYHOOD AND YOUTH, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA,
THE MOUNTAINS OF CALIFORNIA, STICKEEN, SELECTED ESSAYS (Library of America 1997); JOHN
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MUIR, TRAVELS IN ALASKA (Modern Library 2002); see also JERRY MANDER, IN THE ABSENCE OF
THE SACRED: THE FAILURE OF TECHNOLOGY AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE INDIAN NATIONS (1991).
Still others have written of the transcendental character of the environment. See, e.g., WILLIAM
CULLEN BRYANT, Thanatopsis, in YALE BOOK OF AMERICAN VERSE (Thomas R. Lounsbury ed.,
1912).
Legal scholar Carol Rose recently wrote of the environment as a site for contemplation
and recognition of the sacred. Referring to nature as res divinijuris-that which cannot be
owned by man because it is sacred-Rose noted:
I must confess that I once thought there were no real analogs to
this kind of property [i.e., temples, tombs, and religious statuary] in the
tangible public property of modern secular countries, but I now think I
was mistaken. At least in the United States, the great wilderness parks,
deserts and seashores, with their sense of the sublime and the vast, may
in some ways fill the role of res divinijuns.
For Rose:
Such places suggest to the visitor the majesty of creation, the vast-
ness of space, the untamed-ness of something outside human capacity
to grasp. If there is a role for res divinijuns as tangible public property in
our modern jurisprudence, surely this is one place where it resides.
Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the
Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 109 (2003).
In at least partial recognition of the sacred nature of the environment, Congress has
enacted a wide range of environmental protective statutes, including: National Antiquities
Act of 19o6, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (Tooo); National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. §
1-4 (2ooo); Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131-36 (Tooo); National Wildlife Refuge
Administration Act of 1966, I6 U.S.C. § 668dd-ee. (2000); National Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act of 1968, I6 U.S.C. § 1271-87 (2ODD); Endangered Species Act of I973,16 U.S.C. § 1531-44
(2ooo); National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1531-44 (2ooo); Clean Water
Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2Ooo); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 (2000); Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2Ooo); Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 96oi (2Ooo); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000).
B. Recognition of Land's "Consecration" Through Association
with Birth, Newborns, and the Home
Recognition of land's consecration through association with birth, newborns, and the home is
commonplace among cultures historically, and among indigenous cultures and traditional reli-
gious communities today. Examples related to the birthing process include childbirth on the
ground, the traditional burial of the placenta, see, e.g., ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, RITES OF PASSAGE
51 (Monika B. Vizedom & Gabrielle L. Caffee trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 196o), and the
ritual burial of the umbilical cord. Id In all three examples, the land is deemed consecrated
by its association with birth at the same time that the newborn is deemed consecrated by its
association with land. As such, a symbiotic relationship is posited between the sacred nature
of the newborn and that of the land.
Homes, particularly those in which children were born, have been, and continue to be,
considered sacred spaces in many cultures. See, e.g., DURKHEIM, supra. As addressed more fully
later, Radin asserts the significance of the home in shaping one's sense of self. Margaret Jane
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). In some cultures, items blessed
by the child's first bath are used to consecrate the home. See, e.g., VAN GENNEP, supra, at 45-46.
In others, crossing over the portal of one's home amounts to passing into sacred space, rec-
ognized in the Jewish faith by the placement of the mezuzah on external doorways to the
home. Sociologist Van Gennep writes of the importance of the door as a threshold between
2005- 2oo6 ]
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that recognition (or not) has ,had for property law and critical theory. This
Article explores the most important of these consequences, revealing the
special legal solicitude given many but not all sites of death and burial, and
offers a critique of the differential legal treatment accorded such lands by
race.
With the exception of Native American burial sites, which have re-
ceived significant attention in the legal literature, there has been a near
total absence of scholarship regarding law's treatment of land associated
with death and burial and its implications for critical theory.8 While there
has been much written in the humanities on the significations of burial
sites-in the fields of cultural anthropology, history of religion, philosophy,
psychology, and sociology-there has been a dearth of attention to these
the home and the outside, between life and death, ultimately between the sacred and the
profane. Id. at 2o (declaring "[pirecisely: the door is the boundary between the foreign and
domestic worlds in the case of an ordinary dwelling, between the profane and sacred worlds
in the case of a temple. Therefore to cross the threshold is to unite oneself with a new world.
It is thus an important act in marriage, adoption, ordination, and funeral ceremonies."). Like
burial sites, homes receive wide protection, including against vandalism, trespass, and other
incursions on privacy.
In a related fashion, mausoleums have been likened to perpetual homes, thereby inte-
grating the grave and the home as sacred spaces. See, e.g., BLANCHE LINDEN-WARD, SILENT CITY
ON A HILL: LANDSCAPES OF MEMORY AND BOSTON'S MOUNT AUBURN CEMETERY (1989); DAVID
CHARLES SLOANE, THE LAST GREAT NECESSITY: CEMETERIES IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1991). At
Mount Auburn Cemetery, burial plots were commonly treated as extensions of the family
home and were given similar attention with respect to furnishings, including vases, cast-iron
chairs and benches, plantings and other embellishments. Mount Auburn Cemetery's applica-
tion for National Historic Landmark status at 23-24, http://www.mountauburn.org/national-
land mark/history.cfm.
Staying for the moment with the care given burial plots as final homes, the Day of the
Dead, observed in Mexico, Brazil, and other Latin American countries, involves the cleansing
and adornment of family graves along with preparation of elaborate meals and refreshments to
honor the dead. The gravesite as final home receives loving care. See, e.g., Dale Hoyt Palfrey,
The Day of the Dead: Mexico Honors Those Gone But Not Forgotten, MEXICO CONNECT (1995), avail-
able at http://www.mexconnect.com/mex_/muertos.html (describing, "[A]t the family burial
plot in the local cemetery, relatives spruce up each gravesite. In rural villages this may entail
cutting down weeds that have sprouted up during the rainy season, as well as giving tombs a
fresh coat of paint after making any needed structural repairs.").
8 One notable exception is Lawrence Friedman's recent article, positing an evolution in
concepts of liability and redress, whether grounded in tort, contract, or criminal law, for man-
made calamities, looking, inter a/ia, to the 1889 Johnstown flood, the 1927 Mississippi River
flood, and the September I I th attacks. Because Friedman focuses on evolving understandings
of liability, nowhere does he speak to property law's response to, or regulation of, sites of large-
scale loss of life. Lawrence M. Friedman & Joseph Thompson, Total Disaster and Total Justice:
Responses to Man-made Tragedy, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 251 (2003).
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issues in the legal literature. 9 With this Article and others,o I hope to initi-
ate a discussion of the legal doctrinal and theoretical implications of human
attachments to land."
B. The "Sacred" Humanistically Understood
In referencing ideas of the "consecrated," "hallowed," and/or "sacred," I do
not intend a theistic conception of property's place in a larger religio-cos-
mic order, but rather seek to draw on a humanistic understanding of the in-
estimable value of human life.12 As such, my understanding of "the sacred"
9 Patty Gerstenblith and Sarah Harding come closest in the legal literature to address-
ing land's potentially sacred character, understood humanistically, not theistically, and I
build on their insights here. See, e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The
Protection of Cultural Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1995); Sarah Harding,
Value, Obligation, and Cultural Heritage, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 291 (1999); Sarah Harding, Justifying
Repatriation of Native American Cultural Property, 72 IND. L.J. 723 (1997).
1o See, e.g., Mary L. Clark, Keep Your Hands Off My (Dead) Body: A Critical Race, Feminist,
Post-Colonial Critique of the State's Disposition of the Dead, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 45 (2006) [herein-
after Clark, Hands Offl; see also Mary L. Clark, Reconstructing the World Trade Center:An Argument
for the Applicability of Personhood Theory to Commercial Property Ownership and Use, iO9 PENN ST.
L. REV. 815 (2005).
I I In addition to death and burial sites, my current research looks to human attachments
to sites of birth, the home, environmental preservation, and historic preservation, and exam-
ines implications for property law and critical theory.
12 Among those who I draw on for my humanistic understanding of the "sacred" are
writers in the transcendentalist tradition, including RALPH WALDO EMERSON, NATURE AND
OTHER WRITINGS (New York, Random House 1849); HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN; OR,
LIFE IN THE WOODS (Library of America 1854); and the poet WALT WHITMAN, SONG OF MYSELF
(Roycrofters 1855). In Emerson's commencement address at Divinity College circa 1838, for
example, he noted:
For all things proceed out of this same spirit, which is differently
named love, justice, temperance, in its different applications.... In so far
as he roves from these ends, [a man] bereaves himself of power, of aux-
iliaries; his being shrinks .... he becomes less and less, a mote, a point,
until absolute badness is absolute death.
The perception of this law of laws always awakens in the mind a
sentiment which we call the religious sentiment, and which makes our
highest happiness....
... It is the beatitude of man. It makes him illimitable....
... [AIll the expressions of this sentiment are sacred and permanent
in proportion to their purity. [They] affect us deeper, greatlier, than all
other compositions.
Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Divinity School Address, in I TlIE COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH
WALDO EMERSON 76, 78-80 (1971).
I likewise found William James' writings provocative and engaging. See, e.g., WILLIAM
JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN NATURE 34 (Longmans,
Green, and Co. 1920) ("[W]hen in our definition of religion we speak of the individual's rela-
tion to 'what he considers the divine,' we must interpret the term 'divine' very broadly, as
denoting any object that is godlike, whether it be a concrete deity or not.... What relates to
2005- 2oo6]J
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is reflected in the following definitions offered by the Oxford English Dic-
tionary: "4. [rlegarded with or entitled to respect or reverence similar to that
which attaches to holy things;" and "5d. [d]evoted to some purpose, not
to be lightly intruded upon or handled."' 3 In contemplating a non-theistic
understanding of the "sacred," I read widely in the literatures of cultural
anthropology, history, history of religion, philosophy, psychology, semiot-
ics, and sociology for a greater appreciation of human attachments to land,
specifically the human impulse toward reverential space and even more
specifically toward reverential treatment of land associated with death and
burial.'4 In the end, my reference to the "consecrated," "sacred," or "hal-
lowed" character of land is meant to connote that which relates to the most
elevated aspects of human nature and experience.15
C. Roadmap of Discussion
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I highlights the many ways in
which legal rules, principally those directly relating to property law, have
been modified and solicitously applied in relation to land associated with
human death and burial, including principles of adverse possession, dedi-
cation, eminent domain, zoning, taxation, desecration, and trespass. Part
[godlike entities] is the first and last word in the way of truth. Whatever then were most primal
and enveloping and deeply true might at this rate be treated as godlike, and a man's religion
might thus be identified with his attitude, whatever it might be, towards what he felt to be the
primal truth."). See also James' treatment of the importance of Emersonian transcendentalism
in JAMES, supra at 31-33 ("Modern transcendental idealism, Emersonianism, for instance, also
seems to let God evaporate into abstract Ideality. Not a deity in concreto, not a superhuman
person, but the immanent divinity in things, the essentially spiritual structure of the universe,
is the object of the transcendentalist cult.... Such is the Emersonian religion. The universe
has a divine soul of order, which soul is moral, being also the soul within the soul of man.").
Additionally, my thinking benefited from reading IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press i99i) (Kant's final work on eth-
ics, from 1797-98), and IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS xv (John Ladd trans., 2d ed. 1999) (citing IMMANUEL KANT,
FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 53 (Lewis W. Beck trans., 1959) (noting that
"[t]he key to Kant's moral and political philosophy is his conception of the dignity of the in-
dividual. This dignity gives the individual person an intrinsic worth, a value suigeneris that is
'above all price and admits of no equivalent."')).
13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 338-39 (2d ed. 1989).
14 See generally, DURKHEIM, supra note 7 (arguing, interalia, that religion and law are mu-
tually reinforcing, where earliest religions often had organized society as the object of their
reverence).
15 It is interesting in this context to note that, according to Emory historian Cynthia
Patterson, the ancient Greeks prohibited burial in or near sacred land, where death and burial
sites were not themselves considered sacred or hallowed. See generally CYNTHIA PATTERSON, The
Pulis and the Corpse: The Regulation of Burial in Democratic Athens, in DEMOKRATIE, RECHT UND
SOZIALE KONTROLLE IM KLASSISCHEN ATHN 93 (David Cohen & Elisabeth Muiller-Luckner
eds., Schriften des Historischen Kollegs Kolloquien 2oo2).
I[Vol. 94
HALLOWED GROUND
II introduces a series of examples of land associated with large-scale loss
of life, whether through death or burial, that have been accorded special
treatment under the law. In Part III, I contrast the legal solicitude shown
land principally associated with the death and burial of whites with the
lack of solicitude accorded land associated with the death and burial of
non-whites, including slave burial grounds, Native American burial lands,
and sites of large-scale loss of non-white life like the Japanese American
internment camps.
Lastly, in Part IV, I address implications for critical legal theory of rec-
ognizing (or not) the consecrated character of land arising from association
with death and burial, building on Margaret Jane Radin's property for per-
sonhood theory and offering a critical race theory critique of the differential
treatment by race of land associated with death and burial. I conclude with
some thoughts on property law's role in bringing tragedies into the com-
mons by promoting public access to and civic consciousness about these
sites of large-scale loss.
A brief word on what this Article is not. First, because it draws on a non-
sectarian, non-theistic understanding of the "sacred," the Article largely
does not address property consecrated for use by religious entities, such
as houses of worship, religious schools, and camps, etc. 6 Second, because
the Article focuses on the ways in which land comes to be considered sa-
cred (or not) and their implications for the law of real property, it does not
consider the potentially sacred character of personal property, including
jewelry, books, photographs, and other mementos. Finally, the Article is not
concerned with property in the dead body itself, but rather with interests
in land associated with human death and burial.'7
16 See, e.g., AMERICAN SACRED SPACE 13 (David Chidester & Edward T Linenthal eds.,
1995) ("Clearly, places of worship, such as churches, synagogues, mosques, and temples, have
been marked off, ritualized, and interpreted as specific sites of sacred space in America. Often
these sites operate as 'nodal points' in a network of sacred places that defines some larger
religious landscape.").
17 On the question of human bodies, dead or alive, as property, see National Organ
Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984) (prohibiting sale of human bodies
and/or body parts); UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIrT ACT § 2 (1968), 8A U.L.A. 99 (2005) (enabling
transfer of organs from one individual, dead or alive, to another); see also LORi ANDREWS &
DOROTHY NELKIN, THE BODY BAZAAR: THE MARKET FOR HUMAN TISSUE IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY
AGE (200 );Tanya K. Hernandez, The Properry of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971 (I999); Radhika
Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 8o B.U. L. REV. 359 (2000). I have also written
recently of the government's exertion of control over disposition of dead bodies as a property
law issue. See Clark, Hands Off, supra note Io.
2oo5-2oo6]
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I. EXAMPLES OF LEGAL SOLICITUDE GRANTED CERTAIN PARCELS
OF LAND ASSOCIATED WITH HUMAN DEATH AND BURIAL
Property doctrine, as reflected in both the common and statutory law, has
been modified in a number of critical respects by courts and legislatures in
addressing land associated with human death and burial. Some of the ways
in which property law principles have been modified include limitations
on the availability of adverse possession claims to cemetery lands, recogni-
tion of the viability of eminent domain to acquire land deemed significant
through association with death, freedom from taxation on burial lands, and
the development of historic preservation laws to save sites thought hal-
lowed by association with death.
A. Adverse Possession
As a matter of both American law and English precedent, there can be no
adverse possession against dead bodies or cemeteries.' 8 Dead bodies are
res nullius, literally "things belonging to no one,' 9 and thus they can be
neither possessed nor adversely possessed. Cemeteries, by contrast, can be
owned and possessed (where both the cemetery land and the individual
plots can be held in fee simple absolute, i.e., in perpetuity), but cannot
be adversely possessed as a matter of law absent evidence of actual and
complete abandonment of the site as a burial ground, where the burden
of proving abandonment rests with the party seeking to gain title through
adverse possession.20
18 See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 177 (5th ed. 2002). The other
major class of property immune from adverse possession is government-owned property. Id.
19 Seegenerally Hernandez, supra note 17 (providing extensive analysis of property inter-
ests in dead bodies). The concept ofres nullius-that there are things that can be owned by no
one (echoed in part in Radin's commodification revulsion argument, see Radin, supra note 4, at
1855-56, 1855 n.23)-clearly informs the prohibition on payment for human organs codified
in the National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, § io et seq., 98 Stat. 2339 (1984)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 273-74 (2000)).
20 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 164 (2005) (authorizing judicial officer to rule on pe-
titions from city councils as to "why the remains of any deceased person buried in potters
field, or in any neglected or abandoned cemeteries in which no deceased person shall have
been interred within twenty years, should not be removed to and reinterred in a properly
kept incorporated cemetery in the same city or in a town or city adjoining the city in which
the remains of each deceased person or persons are buried, or in lands owned by said city for
cemetery purposes, and to fix the amount of expenses for such removal and reinterment...
."). The statute further provides, "[a]fter said bodies shall have been removed and reinterred
in the manner prescribed by said order, said lands in which such deceased persons were origi-
nally interred shall be available for and subject to such uses for city purposes as the common
council of such city may determine and may be conveyed or otherwise disposed of in the same
manner as other city lands." Id.
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Cemeteries' immunity from adverse possession claims runs counter to
the dominant story of adverse possession's development as a doctrine. By
authorizing the transfer of title from the original owner to the party putting
the property to a more active use, standard adverse possession doctrine cre-
ates incentives for owners to use, monitor, and maintain their property so as
to defeat adverse possession claims. As such, adverse possession doctrine
typically disfavors the non-use of property, authorizing transfer of title to
the higher user so as to promote the economic value of the site.
What then informs the rule of no adverse possession against cemeter-
ies? Is it merely a utilitarian recognition that the value of cemetery land for
other purposes is low, given the presence of mortal remains, headstones,
and other gravemarkers?21 Or is it in recognition of the sacred nature of the
land? Caselaw suggests a combination of the two.
One of the leading cases on point, A.F Hutchinson Land Co. v. Whitehead
Bros.,2 makes clear that both reverence for the dead and pragmatic recog-
nition of the lessened value of cemetery land gave rise to the rule of no
adverse possession against burial grounds:
Every humane instinct urges that the last resting place of the dead
should be preserved from profanation, and the desecration of such place
should make a strong appeal to the conscience of the court. When, however
the land has lost its sacred character, when the remains of those who lie
buried in the soil have disintegrated and mingled with the dust beneath,
when there is nothing left to identify the ashes that lie buried there, when
the names of the dead are no longer heard in the ears of men, and not even
a trace of their memory remains, then, it seems to me, no plausible reason
suggests itself to the mind why such land should be withheld from serving
the needs of a community solely for sentimental reasons ....To perpetually
preserve the soil as sacred and hallowed ground, under such circumstances,
does honor to neither the living nor the dead. 3
Thus, in speaking to the reverential element, the Hutchinson court was
clear that "there can be no actual ouster or adverse possession, to put in
operation the statute of limitations, so long as the dead are there buried,
their graves are marked, and any acts are done tending to preserve their
memory and mark their last resting place."24 Nevertheless, in speaking to
the utilitarian element, the court noted:
21 I wonder, in that regard, whether Plato's law teaching that the dead cannot be buried
in agricultural land relates to this utilitarian recognition that the interment of dead bodies
negatively impacts the usability and/or marketability of the land. See Plato Laws 958e (A.E.
Taylor trans., 1934).
22 A.F. Hutchinson Land Co. v. Whitehead Bros., 217 N.Y.S. 413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1926),
aff'd, 219 N.Y.S. 413 (N.Y. App. Div. 1926).
23 Id. at 423.
24 Id. at 425 (quoting Hines v. State, 149 S.W. 1o58, io6o (Tenn. j91 i)).
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Where the ground ceases to be a place of burial or where it has been perma-
nently appropriated to a use or uses entirely inconsistent with its purpose as
a cemetery, or where it has been so neglected as to lose its identity as such, it
logically follows that under such circumstances title by adverse possession
can be acquired.2 5
Likewise, in Goldstein v. Heirs and Assigns of Cloyd, 6 the Pennsylvania
Court of Common Pleas determined that adverse possession could not be
had against an unabandoned cemetery, declaring, "[tlitle to a burial ground
may not be obtained by adverse possession so long as the dead are buried
there and the graves are marked ....,,7 Indeed, the court there refused to
limit its protection from adverse possession to the land in which the bod-
ies were buried and graves were marked, but extended it to the whole of
the "graveyard or burying ground surrounding the bodies there interred"
so as to preserve the integrity of the cemetery, subsequently referring to
cemetery land as "God's acre.' 'zs
B. Dedication
The doctrine of dedication is another example of property law's solicitude
toward burial lands. This doctrine enables a private individual to designate
part of his or her property for public use as a street, park, burial ground, or
otherwise, typically done in exchange for favorable tax treatment of that
portion of land. 29 Absent explicit, formal dedication as a cemetery, land
may be deemed "dedicated" for use as a burial ground once it has been
"set apart and used for cemetery purposes" by members of the public, and
therefore receive tax benefits.30 The Louisiana Court of Appeal in Thomas
v. Mobley, for example, noted that "regardless of the title to the land itself,
when a plot of ground is set apart and used for cemetery purposes, it be-
comes dedicated to use for such purposes; and that the descendants and
25 Id. at 424.
26 Goldstein v. Heirs and Assigns of Cloyd, 26 Pa. D. & C.zd 235 (Pa. Common Pleas Ct.,
Chester Cty., 1961).
27 Id. at 238 (citing St. Peters' Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Klcinfelter, 30 Dauph.
404, aff'das modifledon other grounds, 96 Pa. Super. 146 (1929)); see also Billings v. Paine, 319
S.W.zd 653, 660 (Mo. 1959) (recognizing that adverse possession may run against unused
burial lot).
28 See Goldstein, z6 Pa. D. & C.zd at 243.
29 See 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning andPlanning § 481 (zoo5) (noting, "In general, where there
is a dedication, the subdivider parts with his interest in the land without formal compensa-
tion, but when the dedication is perfected, the subdivider is no longer liable for taxes on the
dedicated land and is not obligated to maintain it.
30 Thomas v. Mobley, 118 So. 2d 476,478 (La. Ct. App. 196o).
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near relatives of those interred therein are entitled to damages for profana-
tion of these sacred grounds" if subsequently disturbed. 3'
Once "dedicated," whether through explicit agreement or actual pub-
lic use, the portion of land at issue is deemed accessible to the public in
perpetuity, with successors in interest to the dedicated land bound by the
terms of the designation.32 As a result, the fee owner loses his or her right of
exclusive possession and control and is estopped from subsequently alter-
ing the public use to which the dedicated parcel has been put, short of his
or her proof of abandonment by the beneficiaries of the dedication. 33
One of the leading cases on the doctrine of dedication as it relates to
cemeteries is, again, Hutchinson. There, "the plaintiff charge[d] that a por-
tion of the land conveyed ha[d] been used as a cemetery for over a hundred
years; that it was duly dedicated to, and accepted by, the public as a cem-
etery ... ."34 In essence, the plaintiff alleged fraud on the part of the defen-
dant in the sale of land that was not available for commercial development
because of its prior dedication as a cemetery. After recounting that "Roman
law not only hallowed a cemetery, but regarded a single lawful burial as a
dedication of such a site to religious use," the court noted that, "[tihis right,
however, might be extinguished by nonuse, and cemeteries were reserved
from trade only as long as burials remained." 35 Thus, the same duality of
31 Id. (where evidence "reflect[ed] that, commencing in slavery days, a tract of about an
acre in extent had been used for burial purposes by the colored families residing on or near
the Belleview plantation. The previous landowners as well as the Mobleys had acquiesced in
such use, although no formal dedication of the cemetery was ever recorded in the conveyance
records.").
For further discussion of the grave desecration cause of action, see Part II.H, infra.
32 See 23 AM. JUR. ZD Dedication § z8 (2005) ("The dedication is ordinarily irrevocable
between the vendor and such purchasers."). The doctrine of private dedication of land for
public use lost much, though by no means all, of its salience with the rise of zoning in the early
twentieth century, which enabled more systematic planning for public uses such as streets,
parks, cemeteries, etc. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
33 See A.F Hutchinson Land Co. v. Whitehead Bros., 217 N.Y.S. 413, 419 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1926) ("The principle upon which the estoppel rests is, that it would be dishonest, immoral or
indecent, and in some instances even sacrilegious, to reclaim at pleasure property which has
been solemnly devoted to the use of the public, or in furtherance of some charitable or pious
object. The law, therefore, will not permit any one thus to break his own plighted faith....").
34 Id. at 415.
35 Id. at 417 (citing Clarke v. Keating, 17o N.Y.S. 187, 19o (N.Y. App. Div. 1918)); see
also Locke v. Lester, 78 So. zd 14, 16 (La. Ct. App. 1955) (holding that "[a] parcel of land or
property dedicated for use by the general public as a cemetery and which continues to serve
that public purpose, is classified as a public thing... and as such it is not susceptible of own-
ership, cannot be alienated and is not subject to prescription," i.e., adverse possession). The
Locke court cited favorably another court's excerpting at length from a treatise on the law of
cadavers as follows:
Regardless of the laws and rules relating to the ownership and con-
trol of real property, when a plot of ground is set apart for cemetery
purposes, and burials are made in the land, the ground changes its char-
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reverence and utilitarianism in applying the doctrine of dedication as with
adverse possession.
Reflecting on the doctrine of abandonment in the context of dedica-
tion, the court observed:
If no interments have for a long time been made, and cannot be made,
therein, and, in addition thereto, the public, and those interested in its use,
have failed to keep and preserve it as a resting place for the dead, and have
permitted it to be thrown out to the commons, the graves to be worn away,
gravestones and monuments to be destroyed, and the graves to lose their
identity, and if it has been so treated and used or neglected by the pub-
lic as to entirely lose its identity as a graveyard, and is no longer known,
recognized and respected by the public as a graveyard, then it has been
abandoned ....-36
As such, the court gave pragmatic recognition to the need to unburden land
of its restriction to burial purposes once that object had been abandoned.
After all,
[i]f every portion of ground which has been made a burial place for man
should be devoted in perpetuity for burial uses, the most populous and cul-
tivated districts of the world, where millions upon millions of the human
race have sunk into the earth in the countless ages of the past, would have
to be abandoned as a dwelling place or means of support to the living inhab-
itants of the present day37
Instead, "the devotion of land to any particular use must be subject to the
changes and vicissitudes which time may bring to it." 38 Thus, as with ad-
verse possession, the dedication can be abandoned, and the land moved
to a higher, more commercially profitable use, with the burden of proving
abandonment on the party seeking to extinguish the dedication.
As a further example consistent with Hutchinson, the New Jersey Supe-
rior Court in Trustees of the First Presbyterian Church v. Alling recognized that
a prior dedication for burial purposes can be extinguished through aban-
donment, where the land served as "truly a cemetery of by-gone times"
and where it would now be "impossible to restore the cemetery." 39
acter in the minds and feelings of the community. "It assumes a sacred
quality that overrides conveyancers' precedents and requires freedom
from profanation until, by abandonment and removal of the bodies or
by complete disintegration, there remains nothing to appeal to the emo-
tions of the survivors."
Id. (citing Humphreys v. Bennett Oil Corp., 197 So. 222, 228 (La. 1940)).
36 A.E Hutchinson Land Co., 217 N.Y.S. at 42 1.
37 Id. at 424.
38 Id.
39 Trustees of the First Presbyterian Church v. Ailing, 148 A.2d 510, 512-13 (N.J. Super.
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In the end, the use of the dedication doctrine to protect cemetery lands,
like the prohibition on adverse possession against cemeteries, runs coun-
ter to our traditional understanding of property law's emphasis on mov-
ing property to its highest and best use, understood economically, where,
in creating a restraint on alienability, dedication places a "drag" on value,
again understood economically.
C. Partition
By "partition" is meant the power of a tenant in common (i.e., a concurrent
interest holder) to sell or mark off as separate a share of jointly held prop-
erty, thereby converting a co-tenancy into contiguous, or neighboring, in-
dependently held lots. 40 The doctrine of partition has been held not to ap-
ply to cemetery lots as a further illustration of property law's modification,
or adjustment, in the face of association with burial. Thus, for example,
in Goldstein v. the Heirs and Assigns of James Cloyd, the Pennsylvania court
quoted at length from Brown v. Lutheran Church:
Pennsylvania, with a refined and elevated sense of what is due to both
the dead and the living, has forbidden, by statute, the opening of streets,
lanes, alleys, or public roads through any burial ground or cemetery, and has
provided a penalty for wilful [sic] injuries done to grave-yards-not only
to the tombstones and fence-railings, but even to the 'shrubs and plants'
which bereaved love cultivates in such places. 4'
The Brown court continued, "[t]he sentiment is sound, and has the sanc-
tion of mankind in all ages, which regards the resting-place of the dead as
hallowed ground-not subject to the laws of ordinary property, nor liable to
be devoted to common uses.' ' 42 Thus, Brown concluded that partition of a
burial ground "owned by distinct religious societies as tenants in common"
was impermissible as "not within the spirit and meaning of our statutes of
partition."43
Ct. Ch. Div. 1959).
40 Partition is defined as "the act of dividing; esp., the division of real property held
jointly or in common by two or more persons into individually owned interests." BLAcK's LAw
DICTIONARY 11 5 1 (8th ed. 2004).
41 Goldstein, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d at 241-42 (quoting Brown v. Lutheran Church, 23 Pa. 495,
5oo (Pa. 1854)). This passage also highlights potential modification to eminent domain law in
the context of burial lands, i.e., that they are not appropriate sites for invocation of the con-
demnation power for public use.





In 1954, the Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker- recognized "fostering
spirituality" as a valid public use for purposes of exercising the eminent do-
main authority, though spirituality was not itself an element of the public
purpose stated in that case. The Court noted:
[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well
as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious
as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. 45
While eminent domain was endorsed in Berman for the promotion of
spiritual values, and while used in the Gettysburg and Antietam (and other
Civil War battlefield) cases for preservation of death and burial sites, con-
demnations have been struck down where proposed against pre-existing
cemetery land.46 That having been said, eminent domain nevertheless has
been used by the federal government to condemn Native American sacred
sites, including Native American burial sites.47
E. Historic Preservation
As with the use of eminent domain to preserve sites of large-scale loss of
life, the historic preservation movement has been shaped, at least in part,
by ideas of sacred space associated with the death (and life) of great figures,
spawning a wide array of federal protective measures4a While cemeteries
are not typically understood as eligible for historic preservation under the
National Historic Preservation Act,49 a cemetery may be protected under
this rubric if it "derives its primary significance from graves of persons of
transcendent importance."5 Sites of large-scale death and burial, such as
44 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
45 Id. at 33-
46 See, e.g., Memphis State Line R.R. v. Forest Hill Cem. Co., 94 S.W. 69 (Tenn. 19o6)
(declaring railroad company without right to condemn line through cemetery, even though
land had not actually been used for burial purposes); see also Brown, 23 Pa. at 500 (suggesting
eminent domain not appropriate against burial grounds).
47 See Part II.B, infra.
48 See, e.g., National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. § 1-4 (2000); National
Antiquities Act of 19o6, I6 U.S.C. § 431 (zooo); Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act
of 1935, 16 U.S.C. § 461-67 (zooo); Commission for the Preservation of America's Heritage
Abroad of 1985, I6 U.S.C. § 469 (zooo); National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C.
§ 470 (2ooo); Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 47oee-47omm
(2000).
49 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2000).
50 36 C.ER. § 60.4 (2005).
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the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, have been pro-
tected under this rubric.5'
F Zoning
Much has already been written of the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"),52 enacted in response to the
Supreme Court's partial overturning of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act ("RFRA') in City of Boerne v. Flores in 1997.53 RLUIPA prohibits dis-
criminatory zoning of lands used for religious or religiously affiliated pur-
poses, such as houses of worship, religious schools, religious camps, etc. Per
RLUIPA, religious lands, including religious cemeteries, cannot be treated
any less favorably than non-religious lands.
Pre-RLUIPA, traditional Euclidian zoning schemesM had often relegat-
ed cemeteries to the margins of society (both literally and figuratively),
alongside heavy industrial sites, highways, dumps, and mental health insti-
tutions.55 The interplay between RLUIPA and Euclidian zoning suggests
a degree of ambivalence about the solicitude to be granted cemeteries, at
least as it relates to those of a religious nature.
G. Taxation
Most state laws grant cemetery owners broad immunity from tax levies
on their burial lands and related fixtures, such as maintenance buildings,
where state practices vary as to whether the exemption applies to all cem-
eteries or only to not-for-profit cemeteries.5 6 In a parallel fashion, state law
typically exempts individual burial plot owners from property taxes on
51 See infra note 87.
52 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-cc5 (2ooo). Shelley Saxer of Pepperdine has written at length
about governmental regulation of land use by churches, both pre- and post-RLUIPA. See, e.g.,
Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions Targeting First Amendment Land Uses, 69 Mo. L.
REv. 653, 662 (2004) (highlighting RLUIPA-based analysis of eminent domain actions involv-
ing religious lands); Shelley Ross Saxer, When Religion Becomes a Nuisance: Balancing Land Use
and Religious Freedom When Activities of Religious Institutions Bring Outsiders into the Neighborhood,
84 Ky. L.J. 507 (1995-96) (addressing interaction of zoning laws, nuisance principles, and reli-
gious freedom pre-RLUIPA).
53 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding RFRA unconstitutional as ap-
plied to states, but not to federal government).
54 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding comprehen-
sive zoning plan for suburb of Cleveland, Ohio).
55 By direct contrast, historian Cynthia -Patterson recounts that burials in ancient Greece
were had alongside public roads for all to see. See Patterson, supra note 15.
56 See, e.g., Mt. Auburn Cemetery v. City of Cambridge, 22 N.E. 66, 69 (Mass. 1889);
Olive Cemetery Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 93 Pa. 129, 131 (Pa. 188o); City of Seattle v. Mt.
Pleasant Cemetery Co., io9 P. 1052, 1054 (Wash. I9IO).
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their sites s7 As for public cemeteries, they are treated as charities for tax
deduction purposes under the Internal Revenue Code. 5
In a related fashion; land placed in conservancy for historic preservation
purposes-whether to honor the death (or life) of a great figure (or not)
-is also granted favorable tax treatment. This includes lands earmarked
by means of conservation easements, where "the value of the conservation
easement, usually representing the development value of the land, is de-
ductible as a charitable gift on the federal income tax return."59
H. Other Legal Implications
A host of other legal doctrinal consequences flow from recognizing the
consecrated nature of land associated with death and burial, 6o including
broad judicial oversight of burial sites, with some courts likening this to a
trust relationship, 6' and others to the exercise of the police power for public
57 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-47-1o6 (West 1998) (exempting individual burial
plots as well as cemetery grounds generally from taxation); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-41(2) (zoo5)
(providing exemption from taxation under certain circumstances).
58 See, e.g., Anne Berrill Whalen, Note, A Grave Injustice: The Uncharitable Federal Tax
Treatment of Bequests to Public Cemeteries, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 705 (1990); see also JESSICA
MITFORD, God's Little Million Dollar Acre, in THE AMERICAN WAY OF DEATH REVISITED 81-82
(1998).
Prevailing sentiment that there was something special and sacred about
cemetery land, that it deserved special consideration and should not be
subjected to such temporal regulation as taxation, was reflected in court
decisions and state laws.... Other rulings have affirmed that land ac-
quired for cemetery purposes becomes entirely exempt from real estate
taxes the moment it is acquired, even before a dead body is buried in
it.... Cemetery land is tax-free, which is as it should be, since in theory
the land is not to be put to gainful use. Cheap land which for one reason
or another does not easily lend itself to such needs of the living as hous-
ing and agriculture is commonly used for cemeteries.... The winning
combination that has transformed the modern cemetery into a wildly
profitable commercial venture is precisely its tax-free status, the adapt-
ability of cheap land to its purposes, the almost unlimited possibilities
of subdividing the land....
Id. at 82.
59 DUKEMINIER AND KRIER,supra note 18, at 858 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 1.6, cmt & stat. note (2000)).
6o As with our reference to Euclidian zoning above, not all property rules are solicitous of
cemetery lands. Certain rules, such as nuisance regulation, remain unmodified in the face of
burial lands. Thus, cemeteries, like other properties, are subject to nuisance law's balancing of
the social utilities of competing land uses. See, e.g., Harris v. Borough of Fair Haven, 721 A.zd
758, 761 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998).
61 See, e.g., Trustees of the First Presbyterian Church v. Ailing, 148 A.zd 51o, 513 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. I959) (declaring, "A burying ground or cemetery is affected with a public
interest and is a trust.").
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health and welfare;6 2 permitting and reporting requirements for excavation
or other disturbances of historical' or cultural resources on public and pri-
vate lands; 6 3 laws regulating archaeological excavations of burial sites spe-
cifically;64 tort and criminal laws regarding trespass against cemeteries and
other burial sites;65 and tort and criminal law prohibitions on desecration
of graves and headstones,' where the desecration of national cemeteries
constitutes a federal crime. 67
62 See, e.g., In re Hunlock's Creek Cemetery, 16 Pa. D & C. 152, 153 (Ct. of Quarter
Sess'ns, Luzerne Cty. 1930).
63 See, e.g., NAGPRA, infra note IX9; see also Patty Gerstenblith, Protection of Cultural
Heritage Found on Private Land: The Paradigm of the Miami Circle and Regulatory Takings Doctrine
after Lucas, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 65, 102-o6 (2000).
64 For laws regulating archaeological excavations, see Zahra S. Karinshak, Comment,
Relics of the Past-To Whom Do They Belong? The Effect of an Archaeological Excavation on Property
Rights, 46 EMORY L.J. 867 (1997). See also Part III.B for discussion of federal and state laws
specific to Native American historic sites.
65 On the tort law prohibition on trespass against gravesites, see, e.g., Smith & Gaston
Funeral Directors, Inc. v. Dean, 8o So. 2d 227, 230, 233 (Ala. 1955).
66 On the common law tort prohibition on desecration of graves and headstones, see,
e.g., Locke v. Lester, 78 So. 2d i4, I6 (La. Ct. App. 1955) (noting that courts have generally
understood that cemeteries are "regarded by the community as sacred soil, and a cause of ac-
tion is allowed a litigant when the graves of his family in such a public cemetery are disturbed
or desecrated"); see also Chew v. First Presbyterian Church, 237 E 219, 241 (D. Del. 1916)
(holding that a surviving family can seek an injunction against desecration). On the criminal
prohibition of desecration of graves and headstones, see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-149 (zoo5)
(declaring vandalism and desecration of graves Class I felonies); Oatka Cemetery Assoc. v.
Cazeau, 275 N.YS. 355 (N.Y. App. Div. 1934); Conn v. Boylan, 224 N.Y.S.zd 823 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1962); see also PArrY GERSTENBLITH, Cultural Significance and the Kennewick Skeleton, in CLAIMING
THE STONES, NAMING THE BONES: CULTURAL PROPERTY AND THE NEGOTIATION OF NATIONAL AND
ETHNIC IDENTITY 187 n. 39 (Elazar Barkan & Ronald Bush eds., 2002).
Sociologist Arnold Van Gennep's work anticipates these prohibitions on trespass and des-
ecration when he asserts that the separation of the sacred from the profane, both figuratively
represented and actually maintained by the erecting of barriers around burial sites, provides
the outer boundaries to socially acceptable behavior. A sacrilege occurs when a profane person
enters sacred territory, or when a profanation is committed against sacred space. Such profana-
tions are proscribed by the civil and criminal laws of desecration and trespass. VAN GENNEP,
supra note 7, at 15-16.
67 Vandalization of U.S. national cemeteries first became a federal crime during the Civil
War. Today, desecration of national cemeteries, federal monuments and memorials, and/or
national historic preservation sites gives rise to federal criminal liability, with penalties stipu-
lated in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Commission,
Sentencing Commission Increases Penalties for Crimes Against Cultural Heritage (March 29,
2002), available at http://www.nathpo.org/News/News-Legal-Issues5.html.
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II. EXAMPLES OF DEATH AND BURIAL SITES ACCORDED BROAD
SOLICITUDE UNDER PROPERTY AND RELATED LAWS
Our consideration of sites accorded wide solicitude under property and re-
lated laws begins with burial sites traditionally understood, then moves to
sites of large-scale loss of life, and, finally, to memorial sites.
A. Evolving Legal Status of Cemeteries Generally
Ancient Greece and Rome differed markedly in their characterization of
burial sites, where Athens did not treat burial grounds as sacred land,68 while
Rome did. With regard to the latter, legal scholar Charles Reid recounts the
evolving pre-Christian and Christian-era legal regulation of cemeteries as
follows, "[a] decree of the pre-Christian, second-century Roman emperor
Antoninus Pius announced that burial places were 'religious places' (religio-
sa sacra). A subsequent decree of the third-century emperor Philip the Arab
ruled that burial grounds, being religious places, could not be bought or
sold as articles of commerce, ' '69 an early precedent for the decommodifica-
tion of death and burial sites, as with the adverse possession doctrine's im-
munization of cemetery lands generally and the World Trade Center foot-
prints' removal from commerce specifically. As for the evolving Christian
law regulation of burial lands, Reid notes, "[t]he Christian emperors only
strengthened [the Roman emperors' prior] commitments," with Justinian's
Institutes emphasizing that "religious ground, such as a cemetery, was sub-
ject to divine law and could not really be considered anyone's private prop-
erty.' ' 7° Again, burial sites, like dead bodies, were considered res nullius-a
thing owned by no one.
American law builds on these Judeo-Christian understandings of the
sacred nature of burial sites through many of the modifications made to
property law principles highlighted in Part I above. Indeed, state and fed-
eral courts have drawn widely on the Judeo-Christian tradition in resolving
legal questions related to cemetery lands. For example, one New Jersey
court declared:
The place where the dead are buried is regarded generally, if not uni-
versally, as hallowed ground. We express our love for our dead by placing
their bodies in the earth tenderly and sorrowfully,... we give expression to
68 See supra note 14.
69 CHARLES J. REID, The Body of the Human Person in American Law: Sacred Receptacle of the
Holy Spirit or Marketable Commodity?, in FIGURES IN THE CARPET: FINDING THE HUMAN PERSON
IN THE AMERICAN PAST 5-6 (Wilfred McClay ed. forthcoming).
70 Id. (explaining that in Christian theology, the term "cemetery," which "had meant
'sleeping place,' or 'dormitory"' to pre-Christian Greeks ("koimeterion") "came to be used to




our veneration for their dust by adorning and beautifying the spot where it
reposes. Their dust is sacred to us. 7
"Our reverence," the court continued, "creates a strong natural desire that
it shall never be disturbed or desecrated, and that the place where it rests
shall be regarded as consecrated ground, and its beauty preserved until the
end of time.' 72 Likewise, a Maryland court declared, "[t]hrough the ages,
all civilized peoples have considered the final resting place of their dead as
hallowed and sacred ground." 73 A Minnesota court, quoting at length from
the treatise, American Jurisprudence on Cemeteries, observed, "[t]he sentiment
of all civilized peoples regards the resting place of the dead as hallowed
ground, and requires that in some respect it be not treated as subject to the
laws of ordinary property."'74 We shall see in Part III, however, that this so-
licitude toward cemetery land does not extend to sites of death and burial
principally associated with non-whites.
B. Gettysburg National Battlefield and Cemetery
Any reference to the consecration of land by association with death and
burial necessarily evokes Lincoln's address in dedicating the Soldiers' Na-
tional Cemetery at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Deeming the Gettysburg
battlefield hallowed by those who fell there, 75 Lincoln declared:
We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate
a portion of it as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that
that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do
this.
But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate-we can not consecrate-we
can not hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled,
here, have consecrated it far above our power to add or detract.76
71 Moore's Ex'r v. Moore, 25 A. 403,405 (N.J. Ch. 1892).
72 Id.
73 Gallaher v. Trustees of the Cherry Hill Methodist Episcopal Church, 399 A.2d 936,940
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (quoting Diffendall v. Diffendall, 2o9 A.2d 914, 916 (Md. 1965)).
74 State v. Lorentz, 22 N.Wzd 313, 315 (Minn. 1946) (quoting o AM. JUR. Cemeteries §
z), cited in Reid, supra note 69, at 56.
75 African-American soldiers' mortal remains were segregated from those of whites in
national cemeteries from the time of their founding in the Civil War era through World War II.
It was only with Truman's 1948 Executive Order 9981 to integrate the armed forces that white
and non-white soldiers were buried proximate to one another. See, e.g., Arlington National
Cemetary, http://www.arlingtoncemetery.org/historical-information/blackhistory.html (last
visited Oct. 22, 2005) (regarding burial practices for white and non-white soldiers).




More than thirty years after the battlefield's dedication as a cemetery,
the federal government exercised its eminent domain authority to con-
demn the land at issue, then owned by the Gettysburg Electric Railway
Company.77 The Gettysburg Electric Railway Co. case was the first exercise
of eminent domain authority for historic preservation purposes to reach
the Supreme Court, in 1896. There, the Court upheld the validity of the
federal government's stated public purpose to honor the fallen Union sol-
diers,78 avowing, "their graves shall not remain unknown or unhonored." 79
The government's acquisition of the battlefield thus rested at least in part
on the land's perceived hallowed nature. 8°
The impulse toward preservation of hallowed ground embodied in the
Gettysburg battlefield case is likewise seen in the legal status and treatment
of other Civil War sites. The two most prominent examples here are the
founding of Arlington National Cemetery8' and preservation of Antietam
National Battlefield and Cemetery through exercise of the government's
eminent domain power against Robert E. Lee 's family estate, in the first
77 U.S. v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., i6o U.S. 668, 681 (1896).
78 Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the federal government
must articulate a public use justifying exercise of eminent domain authority. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
79 Getiysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 16o U.S. at 683.
8o EDWARD TABOR LINENTHAL, SACRED GROUND: AMERICANS AND THEIR BATTLEFIELDS 3-4
(1991) (noting, "Like visitors to the sacred natural sites of the nation, visitors to battlefields
often use religious language to express their awe, having stood on ground sanctified by the
'blood of our fathers.' In 1886 J. Howard Wert remarked in his guidebook to the Gettysburg
battlefield that 'those who have traversed with us these rock-crowned cliffs have gone over
the most consecrated ground this world contains, except the path of the Savior of the world
as he ascended the rugged heights of Calvary."'); see generally JAMES MCPHERSON, HALLOWED
GROUND: A WALK AT GETTYSBURG (2OO3).
81 Arlington National Cemetery was established immediately post-Civil War in response
to a joint resolution of the House and Senate. The U.S. Congress exercised its eminent do-
main power in siting the cemetery on the grounds of Robert E. Lee's family estate, where
Lee had been the Confederate Army's chief commanding officer during the Civil War. While
the federal government disputed its Fifth Amendment obligation to pay just compensation to
the Lee estate, the Supreme Court determined that such compensation was indeed due. See
United States v. Lee, io6 U.S. 196, 22o (1882) (holding federal government obligated to pay
just compensation per Fifth Amendment to heirs of General Lee following condemnation of
their land to create Arlington National Cemetery).
Arlington's Civil War-era interments have, of course, been supplemented by those of U.S.
veterans felled in subsequent armed conflicts, as well as by non-military officials, including
presidents and chief justices. Today, plaques throughout the site proclaim the cemetery's sta-
tus as hallowed ground, specifically, as the "nation's most sacred shrine":
Welcome to Arlington National Cemetery, Our Nation's Most SacredShrine.
Please conduct yourselves with dignity and respect at all times.
Please remember these are hallowed grounds.




example, and individual farmers, in the second s2 The use of the condem-
nation power, and, later, national historic landmark preservation laws, to
save these sites shows the extent to which property law can and has been
used to create or recognize reverential space associated with human death
and burial.
C. The World Trade Center Footprints
In a story declaring in bold lettering, "TWENTY-FoUR TONS OF ADIRON-
DACK STONE WILL BE SET INTO HALLOWED GROUND ON JULY 4, ' '"3 the New
York Times underscored the perceived consecrated status of the land at the
World Trade Center site following the large-scale loss of life on September
I i, 2001. Continuing, "the sanctity and rawness of that ground, where the
incision of a ceremonial spade would have been regarded by some as the
reopening of an awful wound or the desecration of a cemetery, compelled
state officials to devise another kind of ceremony," 4 the news story's lik-
ening of the building's footprints to a cemetery is apt where nearly 3000
people perished there that day, their remains, if any, mixing with the build-
ings' ashes.
The widespread commitment to hallow the World Trade Center foot-
prints by decommodifying them, i.e., by taking them off the commercial,
82 The September 17, 1862, battle at Antietam, Maryland, remains the bloodiest day
elapsed on American soil, with more than 23,000 soldiers killed, wounded, or missing. See
JAMES M. MCPHERSON, CROSSROADS OF FREEDOM: ANTIETAM 3 (2002). As with Gettysburg and
Arlington, the federal government exercised its eminent domain authority to gain title to the
Antietam battlefield and cemetery from the state of Maryland in the I88os, as the state had in
turn condemned the property from a private farmer after the war.
As with the Arlington cemetery, plaques displayed throughout the Antietam cemetery
proclaim the site's consecration by the valor and death of those interred. Quoting Theodore
O'Hara's Mexican-American War-inspired poem, "The Bivouac of the Dead," the plaques at
Antietam exhort:
Rest on embalmed and sainted dead!
Dear as the blood ye gave;
No impious footstep here shall tread
The herbage of your grave;...
For honor points the hallowed spot
Where valor proudly sleeps.
THEODORE O'HARA, THE BIVOUAC OF THE DEAD (1847) (composed in honor of Kentucky
troops killed in the Mexican-American War). Burial & Memorial Benefits, Theodore O'Hara's
"Bivouac of the Dead," http://www.cem.va.gov/bivouac.htm (last visited Sept. II, 2005).
83 David W. Dunlap, From Granite Block, Freedom Tower Will Rise, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2004, at I (emphasis added).
84 Id. In echoing this widely held sentiment, former New York City mayor, Rudy
Giuliani, declared, "I am convinced that Ground Zero must first and foremost be a memorial.
All other decisions should flow from that goal." Rudy Giuliani, Getting It Right at Ground Zero,
TIME, Sept. 9, 2002, at 67.
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or other, real estate market includes a proposal to confer National Historic
Landmark status on them, as noted above15 Introduced by Representa-
tives Carolyn Maloney of Long Island and Chris Shays of Connecticut, the
proposal is explicitly premised on the land's significance as a burial site, or
final resting place, for those killed on September i i th. The findings upon
which the proposed landmark status lie emphasize the grave-like nature of
the site. Findings 9 and io, for example, provide:
(9) A broad and deep consensus has emerged in the United States that the
former World Trade Center site, and particularly the tower footprints, bear
a uniquely tragic and transcendent significance in our Nation's history due
to the unparalleled events that took place there; the almost unfathomable
number of innocent lives lost;.., and the fact that the circumstances of their
death has meant there is almost no physical trace of most of the victims.
(io) The bedrock footprints of the former World Trade Center towers are in
the area of the site where the greatest number of victims lost their lives and
where the majority of human remains were found, and therefore represent
the final resting place of a majority of the victims.8 6
As such, the proposal assumes the land's consecrated nature as widely ac-
cepted fact.s7 While the proposal lingered in the House and died without a
85 H.R. 3471, io8th Cong. (2oo3). ("A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to
conduct a special resource study of the area at or near the footprints of the former World Trade
Center towers for possibie inclusion in the National Park System to commemorate the tragic
events of September 1 i, 2ooi.")
The Coalition of 9/11 Families played a critical role in pressing for the preservation of the
footprints in undeveloped form. As recently reported in the New York Timem
The remnants are subject to protection under the National Historic
Preservation Act because the transportation hub is largely financed by
the Federal Transit Administration. The Port Authority has agreed to
preserve in place "to the maximum extent feasible" the 84 column
remnants of the north tower and the 39 remnants of the south tower.
However, as many as eight column remnants could be temporarily or
permanently removed to accommodate a fourth PATH train platform.
David Dunlap, After Day of Mourning, New PATH Terminal Begins to Sprout, N.Y. TIM ES, Sept.
13, 2005, at A27.
86 See H.R. 3471, io8th Cong. (2003).
87 As with the World Trade Center footprints, the site of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City was regarded as consecrated by the deaths of 168 people, includ-
ing 19 children in the April 19, 1995 bombing attack. See, e.g., John Kifner, In Oklahoma, a
Week of Remembrance, N.Y. TMMEs, Apr. j8, 2005, at A14 (noting that land on which the Murrah
Building once stood is called "sacred ground" and that Oklahoma City National Memorial
has "become a place of pilgrimage"). More expansive than the World Trade Center footprints,
the Oklahoma City memorial encompasses the entirety of the bombing site and proclaims
to "honor[] the victims, survivors, rescuers, and all who were changed forever on April 19,
1995." The National Park Service, Oklahoma City National Memorial, http://www.nps.gov/
okci/home.htm (last visited Sept. io, zoo5).
Because the Oklahoma City bombing site was already public land, there was no need
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vote, other modifications to the sites' status were negotiated to allow for the
preservation of undeveloped, reverential space.' Thus, the World Trade
Center site has been widely embraced as having been transformed from a
site of the profane ("world trade") to that of the sacred through the large-
scale loss of life suffered there.
D. Other memorial sites
Numerous memorial sites reflect this impulse toward marking sites conse-
crated by human death and burial, such as the Johnstown Flood National
Memorial or the Pearl Harbor Memorial, while other memorials do not rep-
for federal authorities to exercise eminent domain, nor negotiate with private parties (as at
issue in the World Trade Center site), to gain control of the site for purposes of erecting a
national memorial. Rather, the federal government was free to demolish what was left of the
Murrah building, which it did, and to erect a memorial and museum in its place. THE CITY OF
OKLAHOMA CITY, ALFRED P. MURRAH FEDERAL BUILDING BOMBING: FINAL REPORT (1996).
As with the World Trade Center footprints, legislation was introduced in Congress seek-
ing to confer national historic landmark status on the Oklahoma City bombing site. But,
unlike the legislation at issue in the World Trade Center site, the Oklahoma City National
Memorial Act of 1997 was enacted, thereby transferring control of the site in perpetuity to the
National Park Service. Oklahoma City National Memorial Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-58,
I I I Stat. 1261 (1997) ("An Act to establish the Oklahoma City National Memorial as a unit of
the National Park System; to designate the Oklahoma City Memorial Trust, and for other pur-
poses."). In signing the Oklahoma City National Memorial Act, President Clinton declared:
I am pleased to sign today S. 87 1, the "Oklahoma City National Memorial
Act of 1997"....
The significance of the tragedy of the bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, and the meaning and im-
plications of this event for our Nation, compel the establishment of this
memorial as a visible and prominent national shrine.
The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President (Oct. 9, 1997),
http://clinton6.nara.gov/i997/l /1997-I0-o9-president-on-oklahoma-city-national-memorial-
act.html.
By contrast with the Oklahoma City bombing site, other sites recently recognized with
National Historic Landmark designations, including New York City's African Burial Grounds
and the World War II Japanese-American internment camps, have not been so quickly or
unanimously embraced. I discuss these sites' treatment in Part III, infra.
88 Most recently, Governor Pataki stepped in to veto the construction of the agreed-
upon International Freedom Center at Ground Zero, where there had been an increasingly
fractious debate over whether the Center would be critical of the United States in charting the
background to 9/I1, and whether there should be any structures on the memorial site beyond
the memorial itself. A subset of the 9/I victims' families were actively opposed to any criti-
cal references to the United States and, ultimately, to the Center altogether. Their interests
prevailed in Pataki's veto, prompting high-level resignations from the memorial's fund-raising
board, including that of Agnes Gund. See, e.g., Robin Pogrebin, Is Culture Gone at Ground Zero?,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, zoo5, at E33; David Dunlap, Focus Shifts to Retail Plans at Ground Zero,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at B I.
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resent the actual sites of loss, but, rather, constitute the reverential space
created for memorialization, most prominently among them, the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial.
i. Johnstown Flood NationalMemorial. -Dedicated in 1964, the Johnstown
Flood National Memorial commemorates the 2200 individuals killed by the
1889 flood prompted by the bursting of the Conemaugh Lake dam.9 While
framed as a struggle of rich against poor, where the flood imperiled the
30,000 residents of Johnstown, a working-class city, and occurred because
of a rupture in a dam used to form a recreational lake for Andrew Carnegie,
Paul Mellon, and others,90 it is also the site of nearly exclusively white loss.
In 1964, the federal government established the Johnstown Flood National
Memorial, inter alia, to honor those who died and to commemorate the
most damaging flood in the nineteenth-century United States. 9'
2. Pearl Harbor Memorial. - Dedicated in 1962, the U.S.S. Arizona Memo-
rial commemorates the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor of December 7,
1941, in which 2388 individuals died, of those all but 48 members of the
U.S. military. The sunken remains of the U.S.S. Arizona, on which II77
crew died in the attack, were commemorated in 1962 with the dedication
of the floating memorial that exists today.92 Its delayed commemoration is
attributable, not to any ambivalence about memorializing this site of death,
but, rather, by preoccupation with the intervening Korean conflict.93
3. Vietnam Veterans Memorial.-By contrast with the Pearl Harbor Memo-
rial, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial,94 dedicated in 1982, did not have
clear public support at the outset, where the divisive nature of the war,
our humiliation in loss, the controversial selection of Maya Lin, an Asian
-American architecture student, to design the memorial, and the memo-
rial design's somber use of trench and/or grave imagery made for a hotly
contested project.95 Now the single most-visited monument in the United
89 See generally DAVID MCCULLOUGH, "IE JOHNSTOWN FLOOD (1987).
90 Id.
91 National Park Service Cultural Resources, http://www.cr.nps.gov (last visited May 3,
2oo6).
92 National Park Service, USS Arizona Memorial, http://www.nps.gov/usar/ (last visited
May 8, 2oo6).
93 See AMERICAN SACRED SPACE, supra note 16, at 3-4.
94 Vietnam Veterans Memorial: Legacy, http://www.nps.gov/vivefIegacyllegacy.htm (last
visited May 6, 2oo6).
95 As with the Vietnam memorial at its inception, the commemoration of the Vietnam
War-era slayings of four Kent State students by the Ohio National Guard was a highly con-
tested matter, where some labeled "unpatriotic" the memorialization of the dead student war
protestors. See Kent State University, May 4, 197 o , http://www.kent.edu/History/may4-197o/
index.cfm (noting "Kent State's learning community has honored the memories of Allison
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States, the Vietnam Memorial serves as a natural segue to Part III, infra,
in which I consider a range of examples of land associated with death and
burial that have not received special legal solicitude.
The Vietnam Veterans Memorial functions in many ways like a tradi-
tional cemetery, with visitors searching for a particular loved one's name,
often directed to the site by an official guide, and thereafter making offer-
ings to the individual dead, where its iconography is at odds with many war
memorials, such as the Korean War memorial or Arlington's Tomb of the
Unknowns, where there is little to no tribute paid to the individual. That
the memorial was initially so hotly contested and now so widely visited
is striking indeed in the context of my conclusion that property law's so-
licitous treatment of death and burial sites is a mechanism by which those
losses are brought into the commons of public experience and civic con-
sciousness.
III. EXAMPLES OF FAILED OR CONFLICTED LEGAL RECOGNITION
OF SITES ASSOCIATED WITH NON-WHITE DEATH AND BURIAL
I turn now to those sites of death and burial that have not, or only hotly
contestedly, been granted legal solicitude. While by no means an empirical,
or exhaustive, study, the contrast in treatment between the sites that follow
and those cited above suggests a strong correlation between the degree of
legal solicitude accorded a site and the site's association with white or non-
white death or burial. 96
Krause, Jeffrey Miller, Sandra Scheuer and William Schroeder with an enduring dedication to
scholarship that seeks to prevent violence and promote democratic values from public service
to civil discourse .... A university committee, established in 1984, recommended that a perma-
nent memorial be built and indicated 'the site should present the visitor with the opportunity
to inquire into the many reasons and purposes of the events that led to the killing and wound-
ing of students on May 4, 197o, and to encourage a learning process to broaden the perspec-
tive of these events.' A national design competition was initiated in 1985, and the design of
Chicago architect Bruno Ast was selected for the memorial. The memorial was dedicated on
May 4, 199o .... In 1999, permanent markers were placed in the Prentice Hall parking lot to
designate where the students fell.").
96 When seen in this light, there was nothing surprising about the various governments'
failure to respond more urgently to the destitution caused by Hurricane Katrina and the levee
failures in New Orleans, a largely African-American city (69% as of September 2005), especial-
ly where those left behind in the hurricane's wake were disproportionately African-American.
See, e.g., Chart, The Neighborhoods that were Hit Hard and Those That Weren't, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
2005, at A13 (providing neighborhood by neighborhood statistical analysis of racial composi-
tion of those hit hardest by Hurricane Katrina's aftermath); set also Jodi Wilgoren, Storm and
Crisis: The Economic Divide; In Tale of Two Families, a Chasm Between Haves and Have-Nots, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at Ai; John M. Broder, Storm and Crisis: Racial Tension; Amid Criticism of
Federal Efforts, Charges of Racism Are Lodged, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A9.
In this same light, the failure to decommodify the site of the Triangle Shirt Waist factory
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A. Law ' Treatment of Slave Burial Grounds and other
Long-Standing African-American Burial Grounds
In contrast with law's solicitous treatment of cemeteries generally, see Part
IIA above, the history of legal treatment of slave and other long-stand-
ing African-American burial grounds has been one of neglect or outright
disregard.97 These burial sites have not typically benefited from solicitous
application of adverse possession, dedication, eminent domain, trespass,
criminal desecration, and other legal principles. Rather, they have been
permitted to be alternatively overlooked or destroyed.98
In 1991 excavations for a new federal building in Lower Manhattan
exposed the remnants of a seventeenth-century African burial ground, with
fire, where 141 individuals died, could be seen as a product of similar differential treatment by
race and/or ethnicity, where the principally eastern and southern European immigrant women
who worked in the factory, a substantial number of whom were Jewish, were not consid-
ered white at that time. Nevertheless, while the site of the fire was not taken off-market as
a form of commemoration, the fire was memorialized through the enactment of workplace-
safety legislation in New York and elsewhere, as my colleague Mark Niles argues. See also
DAVID VON DREHLE, TRIANGLE: THE FIRE THAT CHANGED AMERICA (Atlantic Monthly Press
2003); NEW YORK, A DOCUMENTARY FILM, EPISODE FOUR, ThE POWER AND THE PEOPLE, 1898-1918
(Steeplechase Films, WGBH Boston, Thirteen WNET, and New York Historical Society
1999).
97 Butsee Female Union Band Assoc. v. Unknown Heirs at Law, 403 E Supp. 540 (D.D.C.
1975), aff'd, 564 E2d 6oo (D.C. Cir. 1977) (reversing order to disinter bodies and sell slave
cemetery where cemetery had been restored to compliance with health codes and cemetery
had been named a historical landmark); Bostwick v. New Hope Baptist Church, I II So. 2d
201 (La. Ct. App. 1959) (modifying order to exclude portion of land awarded to plaintiff where
land was used as "burial ground for colored people of the community").
98 When I undertook this project, I was interested to learn whether class status had as
strong a correlation with non-solicitous treatment in death and burial as did race, and what I
found, to my surprise, was that it did not. While race and class taken together are certainly
linked with poor treatment of land associated with death and burial, not so with class standing
alone. Instead, what I found was that paupers' cemeteries, sometimes called "potters' fields,"
were treated equally solicitously as private cemetery lots, as detailed in Part II.A above. As
a general rule, paupers' graves have been treated better than slave burial grounds, and so
long as the land at issue has been used and maintained as a cemetery, i.e., not abandoned, it
will receive solicitous treatment under the law. See, e.g., Leesburg v. First National Bank, 167
S.E.2d io9 (Va. 1969) (holding town had standing to maintain suit seeking judicial declaration
that certain lands had been dedicated to town as paupers cemetery); Beroujohn v. Mayor and
Alderman of Mobile, 27 Ala. 58 (Ala. 1855) (determining city had responsibility for upkeep of
paupers' cemetery).
Nevertheless, sites associated with the death or burial of individuals from the upper
middle class or above appear to be treated highly solicitously. See, e.g., discussion of the class
composition of the World Trade Center victims and their memorialization in Part IV below,
where seventeen percent of the victims had annual incomes above $200,ooo and where only
6.25 percent of the victims had annual incomes below $z5,ooo, 9/i Victim Compensation Fund
Final Report, infra note 151, at 52, by contrast with the Hurricane Katrina victims, whose me-
dian family income was $25,759. See Wilgoren, supra note 96, at AI.
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mortal remains and burial objects still intact.99 After much controversy,
including outcry at an initial General Services Administration report con-
cluding that the federal building construction should proceed as originally
planned, the site development was halted, with a portion of the land set
aside for consecration and reburial of the mortal remains and erection of a
memorial.' °° Though much disputed, the African Burial Ground ultimately
received National Historic Landmark designation in 1993.101
This "happy ending" was achieved only through substantial lobbying
and organizing efforts, principally of African-Americans, including then-
New York City Mayor David Dinkins, the city's first African-American
mayor, and prominent academics at Howard University,' 2 and, thus, is en-
tirely consistent with the critical race theory critique elaborated in Part IV
below.0 3
99 According to the General Services Administration, approximately 2o,ooo African-
Americans had been interred there between I626 and Emancipation Day in New York in
1827. Cultural and Env. Affairs Save, Historic Federal Buildings, http:/lw3.gsa.govlweb/p/in-
teraia_save.nsf (last visited Sept. 5, 2005). Archaeologist Michael Parker Pearson recounts the
history of the site's discovery as follows:
In 1697 the black community was refused the right of burial in the
churchyards, and from before 1712 to 1794 the African Burial Ground,
outside the city, was used for ten to twenty thousand burials of blacks
and outcast whites. When this area of the city came up for redevelop-
ment in the 198os, the developers, the General Services Administration
["GSA"], commissioned an impact assessment which drew attention to
the presence of the cemetery but concluded that the burials had already
largely been destroyed by later cellars and foundations. As a result the
GSA made no contingency plans for construction in the event of buri-
als being found. When burials were discovered and subsequently an-
nounced at a press conference, there was outrage.
MICHAEL PARKER PEARSON, 'ThE ARCHAEOLOGY OF DEATH AND BURIAL 178 (2000).
IOO See generally Nicholas Confessore, Design is Picked for African Burial Ground, and the
Heckling Begins, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 30, 2005, at B I; Alan Finder, U.S. Suspends Digging at Site of
Cemetery, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1992, at B I.
ioi David W. Dunlap, African Burial Ground Made Historic Site, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 26, I993,
at B3.
102 The Howard University African Burial Ground Project tested, classified, and oversaw
the reburial of 419 sets of remains at the site. Seegenerally Confessore, supra note 1oo.
103 A recent New York Times report underscored this phenomenon of marginalization by
race in burial. The story recounted the failure to mark for 8S years the burial of the body of an
unidentified African-American baby girl, who was the victim of the 1919 Texas hurricane and
whose mortal remains remained in a drawer at the local funeral home, brought out periodically
for curious onlookers, including a local cub scout troop. It was only with the initiative of the
new funeral home director that the baby was buried after more than 70 years, albeit with-
out a headstone. The New York Times article reported that, at last, a donor had recently paid
for a headstone, which cites the baby's affectionate moniker, "Snookems," and states simply,
"Unknown Baby Girl, Victim of 1919 Storm."' Ralph Blumenthal, At Last, After 85 Years, Baby
'Snookems'Has a Stone, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 2004, at Ai6.
Her body, along with hundreds of others, had been left at a funeral
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Looking to less prominent sites, in Dove v. May, the Virginia Supreme
Court rejected the landowner's appeal of a lower court order allowing the
Virginia State Highway Commissioner to build a road over a slave burial site
and move the graves to another location.' °4 Likewise, the Louisiana Court
of Appeals refused recovery for plaintiffs in the case of Thomas v. Mobley,
where defendant Mobleys had cleared their land of headstones and other
gravemarkers of African-Americans interred since the slave era, to whom
the plaintiffs were lineal descendants. The court dismissed the plaintiffs'
grave desecration allegation on the grounds that defendants, whose testi-
mony the court accepted as true, had voluntarily undertaken restoration of
the graveyard. Though the complaint had been filed informapauperis, the
court assessed one-half of defendants' litigation costs against plaintiffs.' °s
home, where her mother supposedly promised to return to claim it but
never did. Whether out of hope that the mother would someday return
or carelessness or callousness, the child, who was black, remained un-
buried for 70 years, her preserved body laid out in a yellow pinafore in
a crepe-lined casket at the Maxwell P Dunne funeral home in Corpus
Christi, seen by only a handful of people who learned the secret. One
was James A. Skrobarcek, a local lawyer, who had been allowed a view-
ing of the mummified body with his Cub Scout troop in the 1950's and
was instrumental in finally getting the headstone. Another was a girl at
the time whose father had worked at the funeral home. But over the
years even they and the funeral home seemed to forget about it.
Rose Hill Memorial Park-where hundreds of victims of the storm
were buried in a mass grave under a boulder placed by the American
Red Cross "in memory of the unidentified dead who lost their lives
in the storm of Sept. 14, 1919"-donated a plot in the children's sec-
tion, and the baby was laid to rest on March 26, 199o. But there was no
marker.
Id.
Another recent news report noted the lack of honor given the burials of unidentified
Mexican aliens who died while trying to cross into the United States. The fate of one indi-
vidual was reported as representative:
[H]e will go into a pauper's grave here in the desert, behind a row
of poison oleander bushes, near a trash mound. He will be wrapped in
a sheet, placed in a particleboard box, sealed in with eight nails and his
grave marked with a cheap concrete headstone. It will read John Doe.
No one will say a word for him. There will be no priest, no prayer,
no lamentation. He will go forgotten, next to 22o other men and women
who drowned in irrigation canals or succumbed to the sun or were dis-
covered dead in the back of a tractor-trailer crossing into the U.S.
"These are illegals, and people don't care about them," said Martin
Sanchez, the gravedigger at the humble Terrace Park Cemetery in
Holtville."
Charlie LeDuff, Just This Side of the Treacherous Border, Here Lies Juan Doe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 2oo4, at Ai6.
io4 See Dove v. May, 113 S.E.2d 840 (Va. I96O).
105 Thomas v. Mobley, I18 So. zd 476,482-84 (La. Ct. App. I96O).
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And, lest it appear that this is exclusively a southern phenomenon, the
New Jersey Superior Court in Harris v. Borough of Fair Haven declined to
grant an injunction requiring the defendant landowner to repair and main-
tain a historic African-American burial ground on his property, where the
burial ground had fallen into disrepair, reasoning that the landowner could
make other legitimate, commercial uses of the land.' °6
B. Conflicted Treatment of Native American Burial Sites
Considered intensely sacred by tribal members,107 Native American burial
sites have been subject to highly conflicted treatment under the law, by
contrast again with the special solicitude traditionally granted cemeter-
ies and other burial sites. Rather than eminent domain power being ex-
ercised to preserve Native American burial sites, as at Gettysburg, Native
American burial sites have themselves been condemned to make way for
other uses. Thus, for example, the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa saw their Wisconsin cemetery grounds condemned by the Army
Corps of Engineers for use as a lighthouse station and their mortal remains
removed.'0 8 Likewise, the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe has sought to challenge
the U.S. government's attempted transfer to South Dakota of property
along the flood plain of the Missouri River that includes Native American
burial sites.109 The federal appeals court ruled that the tribe lacked stand-
ing to challenge the transfer because of its failure to establish an actual or
imminent injury in fact," where the court construed NAGPRA excavation
requirements very narrowly to reach this result.
Claims for recognition of Native American burial sites on federal land,
where so many of the sites are found, must steer between a Scylla and
Charybdis of Free exercise and Establishment Clause concerns."' Specifi-
cally, courts have denied protection to Native American burial sites located
on federal land on the ground that according special solicitude to Native
io6 Harris v. Borough of Fair Haven, 721 A.2d 758, 762 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998).
107 See, e.g., Erica-Irene A. Daes, The Indispensable Function of the Sacred, 13 ST. TIoMAS L.
REV. 29,31 (zooo) (Chairperson-Rapporteur, Working Group on Indigenous Populations).
io8 See Indian Burial and Sacred Grounds Watch (April 2003), http://www.ibsgwatch.im-
agedjinn.com/learn/2003/zoo3april.htm.
io9 See Indian Burial and Sacred Grounds Watch (March zoo3), http://www.ibsgwatch.
imagedjinn.com/learn/aoo3/2003marchl.htm.
i io See Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. Brownlee, 331 F3d 912, 916. But see Yankton Sioux
Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1047, io6o-6i (D.S.D. 2000) (awarding
tribe injunctive relief against planned raising of lake water level for flood control purposes
by federal government where tribe alleged adverse impact on Native American burial site;
mandating federal government fulfill its NAGPRA duty of protection of Native American
mortal remains).
i i i There is well-developed literature on these questions, and my aim is simply to high-
light the principal issues at stake.
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American spiritual claims might amount to an official establishment of re-
ligion, and/or on the ground that the Free Exercise Clause need not ac-
knowledge Native American spiritual beliefs. ' 2 As one commentator re-
cently observed:
A conflict exists between public use and Native American
sacred use of National Park lands.... [T]he majority of [I at-
tempts at compromise have not been successful in withstanding
First Amendment challenges. On one side, mandatory accom-
modation measures can be challenged as being violative of the
Establishment Clause for governmental promotion of a religion.
On the other side, voluntary accommodation measures provide
no legal redress for governmental actions which burden free ex-
ercise rights. "3
Illustrating this phenomenon, the Supreme Court in Lyng v. Northwest In-
dian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, I14 held that the federal government had not
violated tribal members' free exercise rights when it proposed construction
of a logging road through a parcel of National Forest land used for gen-
erations for Native American religious ceremonial purposes, and that to do
otherwise might amount to an establishment of religion."
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act ("AIRFX'), while intend-
ed to resolve this conflict between the demands of the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses vis-A-vis Native American sacred sites, among oth-
112 But see Exec. Order No. 13oo7, 61 Fed. Reg. 2677 (1996) (ordering federal agencies
to accommodate Native American access to and ceremonial use of Native American sacred
sites).
113 Shawna Lee, Note, Government Managed Shrines, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 265, 265-66
(200o).
114 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); see also
Employment Division, Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (I99o) (compelling gov-
ernmental interest test not to be applied to laws of general applicability).
The conflict between U.S. and/or private property rights, Native American free exercise
interests, and concerns for Establishment Clause violations presented in Lyng has been amply
addressed in the legal literature, and thus my treatment of Lyng and related issues is neces-
sarily brief.
115 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442,458. The decision in Lyng was predicated in part on the Court's
refusal to apply Smith's compelling governmental interest test. But see Radin, supra note 7, at
oo6 (citing Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 509 P.2d 1250 (Colo. 1973)) ("One
state court held that a condemnor could not take a parcel sacred to a religious sect unless it
could show no adequate alternative.")
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ers, failed to do so." 6 Enacted in 1978, the Act has been ineffective largely
because it has no judicial enforcement mechanism. ' 7
By contrast with AIRFA, the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act of 199o ("NAGPRA") has proved instrumental in safe-
guarding Native American burial sites from excavation, where planned digs
must be consented to by the relevant tribal entities and where unintend-
ed excavations are to be remedied with an eye to their impact on Native
American interests."' Relying on NAGPRA's excavation protections, the
Yankton Sioux were able to obtain a temporary restraining order against
planned construction that implicated a Native American burial site." 9
While NAGPRA's protections are not insignificant,' 20 the statute was more
1i6 The American Indian Religious Freedom Act ("AIRFA") of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996
(zooo), provides:
On and after August I I, 1978, it shall be the policy of the United
States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right
of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of
the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including
but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects,
and the freedom to worship through ceremonial and traditional rites.
I 17 See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455.
118 25 U.S.C. § 3002(c)(2) (2ooo). This is in addition to NAGPRA's provision for the
return from federal custody of Native American mortal remains, sacred objects, and funerary
objects. 25 U.S.C. § 3001-3013 (2000); seegenerally Jack F Trope and Walter R. Echo-Hawk,
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Ac: Background andLegislative History, 24
ARiz. L.J. 35 (1992) (providing overview of legislative enactment and substantive provisions);
Timothy McKeown and Sherry Hutt, In the Smaller Scope of Conscience: The Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act Twelve Years After, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoLv 153,
171-75 (surveying major NAGPRA excavation cases). McKeown served as the Designated
Federal Official on the NAGPRA Review Committee, see NAGPRA REvIEw CoMMITTEE
REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR 1999, 2000, 2001 (May 2oo3), availabk at http://www.cr.nps.gov/
nagpra/review/Reports-toCongress/RTCMAYo3.PDF
Many states have followed NAGPRA in enacting excavation, repatriation, and reburial
provisions. Indeed, every state plus the District of Columbia has some protective legislation
concerning aboriginal mounds, discovery of human remains, sacred site protections, etc. See,
e.g., Kansas Unmarked Burial Preservation Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. 99 75-2741-75-2754 (1989) (not
limited to Native American remains or burial sites); Louisiana Unmarked Human Burial Sites
Preservation Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8:671-681 (2oo6) (not limited to Native American
remains, but also citing pioneer, Civil War, and other soldiers' burial sites, though not those
of slaves); Massachusetts Unmarked Burial Law, MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, § 38A (specifically
providing for protection and preservation of Native American remains accidentally uncovered
from unmarked graves); Nebraska Unmarked Human Skeletal Remains and Burial Goods
Protection Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 12-1201-1202 (2005) (protections not specific to Native
Americans); North Carolina Archaeological Resources Protection Act (providing protection of
archaeological sites not specifically limited to Native American remains).
119 Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers, 194 F Supp. 2d 977, 986
(D.S.D. 2002).
12o Estimates of the extent of potentially impacted federal holdings of Native American
remains run as high as I8,5oo. See June Camille Bush Raines, One Is Missing: Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: An Overview andAnalysis, in NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL
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than two decades in the making, and its enforcement is subject to the U.S.
government's gatekeeping role in recognizing tribal entities, thereby limit-
ing who can benefit under it.2 '
Recently, some tribes have succeeded, in relatively modest fashion,
in redressing particular desecratory uses of Native American sacred sites,
including burial sites, such as rock-climbing on Wyoming's Devil's Tower
National Monument, or "Bear Lodge" as it is known in Native American
cultures. The parties in the Devil's Tower case had negotiated an agree-
ment for the voluntary cessation of climbing activity in June, when the
most significant Native American worship activities occur there, which a
federal court then upheld on appeal.22
C. Long-delayed Preservation of World War II-era
Japanese-American Internment Camps
On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9o66,
authorizing the secretary of war to round up and detain those "individu-
als of Japanese ancestry located in the United States."''2 3 This order led to
the eventual internment of 120,000 Japanese-Americans between Febru-
ary 1942 and September 1945.124 The Japanese-Americans were interned
under the supervision of the Justice Department, War Department, War
Relocation Authority, and Wartime Civilian Control Agency, ostensibly on
grounds of national security.125 Some internees were killed by U.S. service
AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS 309 (John R. Wunder ed., 1996).
121 See, e.g., Clark, Hands Off, supra note o.
122 Bear Lodge Multiple Use Assn. v. Babbitt, 175 E3d 814, 815 (loth Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1037 (zooo).
123 1 draw on a number of sources in recounting this history, including JoAN Z. BERNSTEIN
ET AL., PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS (U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1982); ROGER
DANIELS, PRISONERS WITHOUT TRIAL: JAPANESE AMERICANS IN WORLD WAR II (1993); Roger
Daniels, Relocation, Redress, and the Report, in JAPANESE AMERICANS, FROM RELOCATION TO
REDRESS I (1986); PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 363-68 (1987); Natsu
Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality after September tt? American Jurisprudence Confronts the
Ruk ofLa, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2002); Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese
American Redress and the "Rating" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists," 8 ASIAN L.J. I (2001); Leti
Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial
Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 4o B.C. L. REV. 477 (1998).
124 Most of the camps were closed by October 1945, although at least one camp, the
Justice Department's internment camp in Crystal City, Texas, did not close until 1947. See
JEFFERY F. BURTON ET AL., CONFINEMENT AND ETHNIcrTY: AN OVERVIEW OF WORLD WAR II
JAPANESE AMERICAN RELOCATION SITES ch. 17 (2ooo).
125 Italian-Americans were also briefly interned during World War II, though many fewer
and for a much shorter period of time. See STEPHEN Fox, TIE UNKNOWN INTERNMENT. AN ORAL
HISTORY OF THE RELOCATION OF ITALIAN AMERICANS DURING WORLD WAR 111 51 (199o).
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members on grounds that they were attempting to escape, while others
died of natural causes or from lack of medical treatment during their con-
finement, with the total dead documented at over I8OO.126
After the war ended, the Japanese-American internment camps were
not preserved. Instead, the camps, located in Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Idaho, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyo-
ming, were put to a range of other uses both public and private. Some of
the sites had been U.S. military bases before their conversion to internment
camps, and they continued to be put to military and other governmental
uses after the war. Others constituted private property pressed into "public
service" by the U.S. military during the war. Some of these were restored
to their former uses or other private commercial uses after the war. 27 None
of the sites were preserved through eminent domain or historic preserva-
tion authority until the 199os, despite the sites' tremendous significance,
culturally, historically, and otherwise.121 In I98O, President Carter formed a
study commission concerning the Japanese-American internments, leading
to an official apology and modest monetary redress to those surviving the
camps through the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.129 Donna Nagata reports
that it was "also about this time when the first pilgrimages to the sites of
former concentration camps began" by multi-generational Japanese-Amer-
ican groups.' 30
Finally, in 1985, as part of a push for redress and reparation for the in-
ternments,' 3' national historic landmark status was conferred on the Man-
126 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, THE EVACUATED PEOPLE: A QUANTITATIVE
DESCRIPTION 145 (U.S. Gov't Printing Ofc. 1946) (War Relocation Authority's final report in-
cluding data on number of internees who died while interned); see also Matsuda, supra note
124, at 365 n. 170 (recounting, inter alia, Japanese American deaths in the internment camps
from lack of adequate medical care).
127 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 127, at 145. Those camps that were
redeveloped for commercial use represent the mirror opposite of the World Trade Center
footprints, where commercial property was decommodified and re-injected into the commons.
In the case of the Japanese-American internment camps, properties once under the control of
the public authorities were withdrawn from the commons and recommodified.
Concern for the post-war treatment of the Japanese-American internment camps brings
to mind, of course, the ongoing status and treatment of Nazi Germany's concentration camps.
Specifically, conflict erupted in the 198os over the Catholic Church's proposed construction
of a convent building on or near the site of one of the concentration camps. The proposal was
eventually abandoned, but only in the face of a firestorm of controversy, centering, in many
ways, on concern for the resulting desecration of the site, albeit through the construction of a
religious facility.
128 Seesupra note 124.
129 Called the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, it was
formed by legislation in I98O. See, e.g., DONNA K. NAGATA, LEGACY OF INJUSTICE: EXPLORING
THE CROSS-GENERATIONAL IMPACT OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 186, 190 (1993).
130 Id. at 19o.
131 In addition to the granting of the writ of coram nobis in Korematsu v. United States,
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zanar Relocation Center located in eastern California. 131 In 1992, Manzanar
was established as a National Historic Site.' 33 Then, in January 2001, the
Interior Department completed a major study of the conditions of ten of
the internment camps,' 34 focused largely on the possibility of their preser-
vation and management by the National Park Service.'35 Interior Secretary
Bruce Babbitt in his report to the president recommended that the federal
government move forward with preserving the sites, again through the ex-
ercise of eminent domain and/or historic preservation authority. More spe-
cifically, the Interior Department advocated "develop[ing] an interpretive
concept plan for all ten Japanese Internment Sites" and "pursu[ing] and/or
improv[ingl/increas[ing] National Register of Historic Places or National
Historic Landmark designation for each of these sites."136 While to be ap-
plauded and encouraged, these efforts were notably slow in coming,' 37 once
584 F Supp. i4o6 (N.D. Cal. 1984), the 198os saw the enactment of the Civil Liberties Act
of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1989b-1989b-9 (2000), granting $20,oO to surviving internees
and establishing an educational fund for their descendants. The Act acknowledged that "a
grave injustice was done to both citizens and permanent residents of Japanese ancestry by
the evacuation, relocation, and internment of civilians during World War II." 50 U.S.C. app. §
1989 (2000).
132 Manzanar had previously been placed on the National Register of Historic Places in
1976. See Japanese-American National Historic Theme Study Act, Pub. L. No. 102-248, io6
Star. 40 (1992)
133 Manzanar was named a National Historic Site pursuant to the Japanese-American
National Historic Theme Study Act, Pub. L. No. 102-248, io6 Stat. 40 (1992) (providing "for
the protection and interpretation of the historical, cultural, and natural resources associated
with the relocation of Japanese-Americans during World War II. ). It opened to the public
in April 2004.
134 The report focused on the ten internment camps over which the Interior Department
has or had jurisdiction. "Executive Summary," U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT: JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTERNMENT SITES PRESERVATION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I
(2001 ), available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online-books/internment/report2.htm.
135 By executive order of November 9, 2000, President Clinton directed the secretary of
the interior to conduct a follow-on study to a report on the current conditions of the World War
II internment sites, commissioned by the Western Archaeological and Conservation Center of
the National Park Service. See id.
The Interior Department's report includes general recommendations for proposed ac-
tions on the internment sites and specific recommendations for proposed action on each
site, including detailed reports about ten of the most important sites (Manzanar, Tule Lake,
Granada, Topaz, Heart Mountain, Minidoka, Gila River, Poston, Jerome, and Rohwer). Id. at
2-3. According to the Interior Department's report, all ten sites "were assessed by NPS in the
mid-i98o's and Manzanar was determined to be the best preserved and have the greatest
potential as a national park unit." Id.
136 U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 126, at 1-2.
137 Likewise, Congress' zooo enactment of legislation authorizing the establishment of
the Sand Creek Massacre National Historic Site, memorializing the site of the 1864 massa-
cre of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians in Colorado. See Angela R. Riley, Indian Remains;
Human Rights: Reconsidering Entitlement Under NAGPRA, 34 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 49,
90-91 (2002). One hundred thirty-six years after the fact, the commitment to honor the dead
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again demonstrating the differential use of property law to protect and pre-
serve sites of white and non-white death and burial.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CRITICAL THEORY OF RECOGNIZING (OR NOT)
THE CONSECRATED NATURE OF LAND ASSOCIATED
WITH DEATH AND BURIAL
Should land touched by human death and burial be treated solicitously un-
der the law? If so, why and how? This is ultimately this Article's normative
concern. Consistent with my broader concern for property law's regulation
of human attachments to land, I argue that sites associated with death and
burial should be given legal solicitude because of the profound personhood
interests at stake, where Radin's insight that property can be importantly
constitutive of the self applies at least as profoundly to sites of death and
burial as to other properties she cites, including family heirlooms and the
home.
Radin's property for personhood scholarship was an enormously signifi-
cant intervention in property law theory,38 building on Hegel's personal-
ity theory regarding the importance of attachment to property to the full
development of the self.139 Stated briefly, Radin, and Hegel, argue that
individuals must have control over certain items of property in their im-
mediate environment to become fully constituted selves. Radin grounds
her personhood theory in an intuitive understanding that different items
of property have different effects on an individual's self-constitution. Her
intuition is that
[miost people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of them-
selves. These objects are closely bound up with personhood because they
are part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities
in the world. They may be as different as people are different, but some
common examples might be a wedding ring, a portrait, an heirloom, or a
house. '4°
While Radin does not extend her analysis to death and burial sites, I
argue that her insight for the constitutive power of property for personhood
applies at least as significantly to these properties as to any other.
Having concluded that land associated with death and burial should
be accorded legal solicitude because of its importance to personhood, such
is welcome but long overdue.
138 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 7;see also MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES
(1996); MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993).
139 See, e.g., HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT TI 41 , 44 (TM. Knox trans., 1967) (arguing
that individual will is embodied in objects in external world).
14o Radin, supra note 7, at 959.
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solicitude must be granted without disparity as to race, or class, or other
attribute, quite to the contrary of what has historically happened. As such,
I offer a critical race theory critique of property law's treatment of land as-
sociated with death and burial.' 4'
By "critical race theory," I reference that body of legal criticism cen-
tering issues of race in its analysis, including recognition of the multidi-
mensional nature of racial identity.'42 As critical race scholar Angela Harris
notes, "CRT ["Critical Race Theory"] inherits from CLS ["Critical Legal
Studies"] a commitment to being 'critical,' which in this sense means also
to be 'radical'-to locate problems not at the surface of doctrine but in the
deep structure of American law and culture."' 43Critical race theory is often
coupled with anti-subordination theory, an analysis of the ways in which
law has structured white domination over non-whites.144 For Harris, and for
CRT scholars generally, "racism is not only a matter of individual prejudice
and everyday practice; rather, race is deeply embedded in language, per-
ceptions, and perhaps even 'reason' itself."' 4S With such recognition, I do
not intend to develop an intent-based discrimination theory,' 46 but, rather,
141 See also DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAW: I836-I948 (U. Tex. Press 1998)
7, noting:
The long struggle against racial segregation demonstrates that the spati-
ality of racism was a central component of the social structure of racial hi-
erarchy, that efforts to transform or maintain these relations entailed the
reconfiguration or reinforcing of these geographies, and that participants
were very much aware of this. Space and power are so tightly bound that
changing one necessarily entails changing the other. In fact, many con-
temporary human geographers argue that it doesn't make sense to think
of them as 'separate' at all. Space can often be seen as the embodiment
of power; power as the point of spatial differentiation.
Id.
142 In developing my critical race theory critique of the differential treatment of death
and burial sites, I looked, inter alia, to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: 'T1HE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw ed., 1995); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW
CRITICAL RACE "THEoRY (Francisco Valdes ed., 2003); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. I 241 (1993);
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Foreword: CriticalRace Histories: In and Out, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1187
(2004); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: "Intersectionality," "Multidimensionality," and
the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285 (2oo I); Charles
R. Lawrence, III, The Id., the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Mar Matsuda, supra note 123.
I43 Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 8z CAL. L. REV. 741,
7430(994).
144 See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW (1987) (discussing anti-subordination theory in specifically feminist context); Denise C.
Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis after U.S. v. Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-1z
Single-Sex Public Schools, I999 U. CHI. LEGAL F 381 (providing an example of anti-subordina-
tion theory in critical race feminist context).
145 Id.
146 I recognize the difficulty of satisfying the Court's discriminatory intent standard
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draw on Charles Lawrence's important work on unconscious racism, namely
The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection, in which he argues that the Supreme
Court has adopted an unduly crabbed understanding of intent that fails to
account for unconscious racism.' 47 Unconscious racism can be a powerful
force driving human behavior and legal decisionmaking, and surely con-
as articulated in Washington v. Davis, where equal protection violations will be found only
where the law at issue is discriminatory on its face or where the law's discriminatory purpose
becomes manifest through its application. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding
heightened scrutiny applicable only to cases with proof of discriminatory intent); see, e.g.,
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race': The Inversion of Privilege
and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 ILL. L. REv. 615 (z°°3); Jason Gillmer,
Note, United States v. Clary, Equal Protection and the Crack Statute, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 497, 506-
07 (1995). My critical race critique would likely have stronger footing in the discriminatory
application prong than in the overt purpose prong.
147 Charles R. Lawrence III, supra note 142, 322-23 (198 7):
There are two explanations for the unconscious nature of our racial-
ly discriminatory beliefs and ideas. First, Freudian theory states that the
human mind defends itself against the discomfort of guilt by denying or
refusing to recognize those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that conflict with
what the individual has learned is good or right....
Second, the theory of cognitive psychology states that the culture-
including, for example, the media and an individual's parents, peers, and
authority figures-transmits certain beliefs and preferences. Because
these beliefs are so much a part of the culture, they are not experienced
as explicit lessons. Instead, they seem part of the individual's rational
ordering of her perceptions of the world. The individual is unaware, for
example, that the ubiquitous presence of a cultural stereotype has in-
fluenced her perception that blacks are lazy or unintelligent. Because
racism is so deeply ingrained in our culture, it is likely to be transmit-
ted by tacit understandings: Even if a child is not told that blacks are
inferior, he learns that lesson by observing the behavior of others. These
tacit understandings, because they have never been articulated, are less
likely to be experienced at a conscious level.
In short, requiring proof of conscious or intentional motivation as
a prerequisite to constitutional recognition that a decision is race-de-
pendent ignores much of what we understand about how the human
mind works. It also disregards both the irrationality of racism and the
profound effect that the history of American race relations has had on
the individual and collective unconscious.
See also Barbara Flagg, Was Blind But Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 980 (1993) (observing "the threshold requirement
that the constitutional plaintiff prove discriminatory intent operates to draw a sharp distinc-
tion between facially neutral but unconsciously race-specific instances of white decisionmak-
ing, on the one hand, and the deliberate use of race, whether overt or covert, on the other; only
the latter is constitutionally impermissible. Relying on a distinction among discriminators'
states of mind seems a curious strategy for implementing the principle that the use of race as
a criterion of decision is what constitutes the constitutional harm, because the racial criterion
is equally present in either case. Indeed, the chosen rule appears more suited to drive the race




tributes to the differential valuation placed on white and non-white death
and burial sites as reflected in their different legal treatment.
As the examples in Parts I, II, and III suggest, race is an important factor
in understanding whether and what degree of legal solicitude is accorded
land associated with human death and burial.' 48 Hierarchies of race and
ethnicity segregate people in death, with the land on which they died and/
or were buried treated differently. Gerald Torres and Lani Guinier offer yet
another example of this phenomenon in The Miner's Canary, where they tell
of a plaque at a local courthouse "commemorating World War I ... veterans
by color," with "'white' on top, 'Indian' in the middle, and 'colored' on the
bottom." '49
I am, of course, quick to note that the critical race critique is not an all-
or-nothing proposition, where such dichotomies are counter-productive. It
is not a question of whether the difference in legal treatment is fully ascrib-
able to questions of race or not, or, alternatively, to questions of national
security or not, but, rather, to recognize that race is a critical element of the
story, and that national security is a critical element of some of these stories
also. It is beyond question, for example, that the September i ith strikes
against the World Trade Center would and should be memorialized, given
the site's significance as the locus of the most significant foreign-sponsored
terrorist attacks in the United States. What was surprising was the alacrity
with which consensus formed that the fitting tribute to the dead was to
decommodify the site altogether. Thus, again, the question is not so much
whether the World Trade Center footprints would be preserved, but, rather,
whether they would be preserved unquestioningly or only haltingly.
Staying for the moment with the World Trade Center site, the Septem-
ber i ith Victim Compensation Fund places the racial composition of the
victims there at 75.9 percent non-Hispanic white, 9.4 percent Hispanic, 7.9
percent non-Hispanic black, 6.3 percent Asian and Pacific Islander, and 0.4
percent other.'5° I recognize, of course, the striking race and class disparities
148 See Greg Owen et al., The Sociology of Death: A Historical Overview, 1875-1985, in
DEATH AND IDENTITY 80, 93 (Robert Fulton & Robert Bendiksen eds., 3d ed. 1994) ("In his
1950 study of American cemeteries, Kephart showed that social class is reflected and main-
tained after death by the manner in which the dead are buried."); see also MICHAEL C. KEARL,
ENDINGS: A SOCIOLOGY Or DEATH AND DYING 52 (Oxford Univ. Press 1989) ("We are stratified
in death as we are in life. In contemporary American society, the location of burial is still deter-
mined on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, and social class.... Cemeteries serve as central
cultural totems for the living.").
149 GERALD TORRES & LANI GUINIER, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 77 (2002).
150 WTC Statistics, http:/lwww.septemberIivictims.com/septemberiIvictims/wtc-stat
istics.htm (relying on a preliminary New York City Health Department report on the WTC
victims' demographics, which was in turn based on 2617 death certificates filed with the city,
including those on behalf of the two planes' passengers and crews) (last visited May 8, 2006).
The Fund's website also provides a breakdown of the countries of origin, and foreign
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among the victims, where the financial services executives were dispro-
portionately white with significant incomes, while the service workers, in-
cluding the restaurant workers, were not. By contrast with the World Trade
Center site as a whole, the slave burial grounds, the African Burial Ground,
the Native American burial sites, and the Japanese-American internment
camps were exclusively non-white. And, while it took a highly organized
campaign on the part of well-placed African-American politicians and aca-
demicians to preserve the African Burial Grounds, and a similar effort on
the part of Japanese Americans to preserve the World War II-era intern-
ment camps, it is unclear the extent to which the 9/I I victims' families are
key to the preservation of the World Trade Center footprints. Surely they
have been influential in monitoring the planning for the site, with a subset
of the families successfully defeating plans for the International Freedom
Center and Drawing Center on that site,' 5' but the footprints would likely
have been preserved anyway, given the widespread public sentiment on
that issue.
Pierre Bourdieu argues that law "consecrates" power relations.152 That
the law should be employed in such a way as to give more recognition to
citizenship, of all September 11 th victims, including those in the Pentagon attack and the
Pennsylvania crash site. U.S. Department of Justice's September I ith Victim Compensation
Fund, September I I, zooi Victims: Victims By Country and Citizenship, http://22z.
septemberiivictims.com/septemberilvictims/COUNTRYCITIZENSHiP.htm. The site makes
clear which statistics go to the World Trade Center victims standing alone, and which
encompass all of the September I sth victims.
151 See, e.g., Pogrebin, supra note 88, at E33. Now the 9/I families are beginning to
target the planned retail space as well. Dunlap, supra note 88, at B I, reporting:
[T]he executive director of the [Port] Authority said that none of
the retail space would be within the memorial quadrant, which is the
site of the twin tower footprints and is seen as untouchable for uses
other than those related to 9/II ...
Yet there is a chance that retail space around the quadrant could
come in for some of the same criticism that felled the Freedom Center:
that it would detract from the solemnity of the memorial.
"Are they going to have Victoria's Secret selling underwear?"
asked Charles Wolf, a leader in the fight against the Freedom Center,
whose wife Katherine Wolf worked in the North Tower and was killed
on September I I. "Who knows? The fact of the matter is that families
have a right to deal with the memorial quadrant and its environs. How
hypocritical will it be for us to have a totally 9/ii-related memorial
quadrant and directly across Greenwich Street you have shops facing it
which, overtly by their signage, are inappropriate?"
Id.
152 PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 188 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1977).
Law does no more than symbolically consecrate-by recording it in a
form which renders it both eternal and universal-the structure of the
power relation between groups and classes which is produced and guar-
anteed practically by the functioning of these mechanisms .... The law
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burial sites of whites than non-whites is unsurprising when viewed through
this lens. Indeed, in reflecting on the difference in treatment, a dynamic
emerged that where an individual, or their racial affiliation group, had been
treated as property in life, then the land on which they died, or in which
they were buried, was not treated solicitously and was not decommodi-
fled in death, i.e., not treated as beyond the market. Take, for example,
slave burial grounds, which have been largely unprotected. Rather than
being taken off-market in honor of those whose remains are interred there,
these sites are regularly ignored or discounted as burial lands and returned,
or maintained in, the flow of commerce. As such, there appears to be an
inverse correlation between commodification of bodies in life and decom-
modification of land in death.
I also noted a distinctive pattern whereby Native American burial sites
were "religified" in a manner underscoring potential Establishment Clause
concerns and thus precluding legal protection, while conventional religious
burial sites, such as churchyard cemeteries, have been granted significant
solicitude under property laws.
Before concluding that the difference in treatment of death and burial
sites is explainable by reason of race, I sought to explore other non-dis-
criminatory motives in an effort to determine whether they satisfactorily
explain the difference. The public versus private ownership of the sites
in question, for example, turns out to be an unsatisfactory explanation for
the difference in treatment, where the sites of disproportionately white
death whose title was held privately were brought into the public realm by
virtue of eminent domain, as with the Gettysburg battlefield, or through
protracted negotiation with private and public parties, as with the World
Trade Center. By contrast, the hotly contested, long-delayed, preservation
of the African Burial Grounds, which were entirely on public property, and
the Japanese-American internment camps, many of which were on federal
property, and thus neither requiring acquisition of title, demonstrates the
inadequacy of the public/private distinction as an explanation for the dif-
ference in treatment.
Nor is the public versus private nature of the crises befalling the sites
necessarily a satisfactory explanation for their difference in treatment.
While the World Trade Center was the site of an unprecedented national
security crisis (the first, and second, foreign-sponsored terrorist attacks on
American soil'53), the Japanese-American internment camps were them-
selves premised on a national security crisis but were not the subject of
thus contributes its own (specifically symbolic) force to the action of the
various mechanisms which render it superfluous constantly to reassert
power relations by overtly resorting to force.
Id.
153 Here, I am referring to both the 9/I 1 attack and the February 27, 1993 bombing of
the World Trade Center garage.
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significant historic preservation efforts until just very recently. Of course,
one way to understand this difference is that the World Trade Center site
became a rallying point for national unity and pride for many, while the
internment camps are a source of national shame.
Stemming directly from this last observation, another possible basis
for distinguishing among the examples cited in Parts II and III is an un-
derstanding that those properties associated with a shameful history, e.g.,
slave burial grounds and the Japanese-American internment camps, are
shunned from public consciousness and not preserved, while those serving
as a rallying cry for nationalist pride, e.g., the World Trade Center site, the
Gettysburg battlefield, and Pearl Harbor, are preserved. Of course, the as-
sociations with shameful history cited above are likewise associations with
historically subordinated minorities within the United States.
Victims' status as heroes, or not, and/or as sympathetic, or not, is anoth-
er related potential basis for distinguishing between what land is deemed
consecrated by their deaths and given legal solicitude, and what is not.
Nevertheless, the definition of who is a hero or who is sympathetic is im-
mensely subjective and susceptible to disparate treatment along racial
lines. Status as a hero or sympathetic victim is more readily granted when
the victims are white, as disproportionately true in the World Trade Center
example, and less readily so when the victims are non-white, as with the
Japanese American internment camps (or the MOVE firebombing crisis in
Philadelphia in the mid I98os).154
Yet another explanation for why the World Trade Center footprints
were decommodified while other sites, including that of the Triangle Shirt
Waist factory fire, for example, were not is that the World Trade Center at-
tack occurred during a period of relative prosperity, while the Triangle fire
did not. In the early part of the twentieth century, emphasis was on full and
rapid commercial and industrial development, and so decommodification
of the Triangle site was neither possible nor desirable. The site was instead
commemorated by two plaques. 55 By contrast, the state of the economy at
the time of the September I I h attack enabled the decommodification of
that site, even despite its status as some of the most valuable real estate in
the world. Arguably relevant to the redevelopment planning for the World
Trade Center site is the fact that the devastation wrought by the Septem-
ber i ith attack led to a depressed real estate market in Lower Manhattan,
thereby reducing the value of the World Trade Center parcel and making
its decommodification less costly, though nevertheless remarkable.
154 See, e.g, z Members of Radical Group Are Buried In Pennsylvania, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 6,
1985, at Az8.
155 Likewise, the Chicago Fire of 1871 and the San Francisco earthquake of 19o6 were
not commemorated in the fashion of the World Trade Center footprints, where not only was
the damage and loss of life widespread, rather than concentrated, but the state of the economy
would not have encouraged or allowed such commemorative uses (or non-uses).
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In the end, preservation of land associated with death and burial of non-
whites can be a powerful form (among others) of reparation for histories of
racial oppression. To be clear, it would not be sufficient standing alone, but,
rather, can be an important tool in combination with others. The decision
to use property law to preserve off-market land associated with the death
and burial of historically subordinated peoples can be an important step
in redress and rebuilding of trust, relationships, good will, etc.-of repara-
tion at its most fundamental level.'56 Instead, non-whites have been largely
barred from the realm of the sacred (again, humanistically understood), and
their suffering has been largely excluded from the commons of public ex-
perience and consciousness, through the less, or un-, solicitous treatment of
their death and burial sites, thereby undermining their ultimate humanity
through relegation to the world of the profane.'57
CONCLUSION
A. Thoughts on Tragedies "in" the Commons and the Recognition
(or Not) of Land's Consecration Through Association
with Human Death and Burial
The modifications to property law doctrine explored in Part I above can be,
and often are, used to bring private tragedies into the commons of public
experience, reinfusing sites of death and burial into the public domain of
physical access and civic consciousness. 18 In referencing tragedies "in" the
156 Having noted the potential reparational nature of the decision to commemorate hu-
man tragedy through the preservation of land associated with death and/or burial, I wish to at
least take a crack at articulating a theory of reparations, i.e., why are reparations necessary or
justified in response to human tragedy? What goals do they serve? As a public acknowledge-
ment of wrong-doing? As a symbolic welcoming into full citizenship for those who have been
historically denied participation on equal terms?
In seeking to articulate a theory of reparations, I recognize the need to articulate the most
significant objections to reparations, principally those grounded in concerns for the magnitude
of the cost and for whether past wrongs can or should be redressed through present-day rem-
edies. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 124, at 373-74 (enumerating standard objections to repara-
tions claims as: "(i) factual objections and excuse or justification for illegal acts; (2) difficult
identification of perpetrator and victim groups; (3) lack of sufficient connection between past
wrong and present claim; and (4) difficulty of calculation of damages"). Rather than approach-
ing the question of form of redress as one of either/or, i.e., either commemoration through
memorializing site or payment of damages, I argue that commemoration through public rec-
ognition of land's consecration is one of several tools that can be drawn on in a reparations
effort, e.g., the preservation of slave burial grounds as well as the payment of damages to the
descendants of slaves.
157 Again, as so powerfully illustrated in the recent devastation in New Orleans.
158 In a related fashion, in Elemerntary Forms of Reigious Life, Durkheim hypothesizes that
the object of worship in indigenous societies is society itself. See Emile Durkheim, Concerning
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commons in the title to this section, I wish to be clear that my concern here
is for the uses to which actual tragedies are, and have been, put, i.e., the
extent to which tragedies are, or have been, incorporated into the "com-
mons" of public experience, and not for Garret Hardin's concern for the
metaphoric tragedy "of" the commons arising from law's failure to incentiv-
ize investment in commonly held property.'5 9
Consider in this vein Civil War battlefields. Though soldiers fought and
fell principally on private farm land, these sites were brought into the com-
mons of public access and memory by the exercise of eminent domain,
rendering them explicitly public property. Not only did this give the public
ready physical access to Civil War sites, but it promoted the public's aware-
ness of the deaths that had occurred there. Likewise with the World Trade
Center, where, by decommodifying the World Trade Center footprints and
reinfusing them into the commons for use as a public memorial, redevelop-
ment officials have assured the public's ready physical access to the site and
ongoing consciousness of the loss of life suffered there.
By contrast, the Japanese-American internment camps, with many situ-
ated on public lands, remained far outside the "commons" of public ac-
cess and consciousness until very recently.' 60 As a result, the tragedy of the
the Definition of Religious Phenomena, in DURKHEIM ON RELIGION: A SELECTION OF READINGS
WITH BIBLIOGRAPHIES 93, 98 (W.S.E Pickering ed., 1975). Historian John R. Gillis posits the
development of an American civic religion premised on worship of society in his work on
nineteenth century monument and memorial-building. John R. Gillis, Memory andIdentily: The
History of a Relationship, in COMMEMORATIONS: TIIE POLITICS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY 19 (John
R. Gillis ed. 1994) (noting "[iln the course of the nineteenth century, nations came to worship
themselves through their pasts, ritualizing and commemorating to the point that their sacred
sites and times became the secular equivalent of shrines and holy days.").
Where fundamental spiritual impulses are directed toward one's society of origin, the loss
of one or more members of that society is understandably cause for grief and memorialization,
especially so when the loss of life is on a large scale. Pursuant to the Durkheimian model, we
can see the potential for greater solicitude afforded those "like us," i.e., like the majority or
dominant people, whose death is experienced directly, not distantly, with the result that their
loss is treated solicitously under the law. By contrast, the death of those not "like us," vari-
ously understood as the "Other," the "outsider," the subordinated, is treated at best ambiva-
lently and more often negligibly, where the loss is experienced, if experienced at all, indirectly
and remotely. This phenomenon is amply well illustrated by the federal government's initial
failure to respond to the devastation and loss of life wrought by Hurricane Katrina in New
Orleans.
159 See, e.g., Hardin, supra note 5.
16o The Japanese-American internment camps entered the commons of public access
and consciousness only through a concerted campaign for redress and reparations, which cul-
minated in many respects in the 1988 Civil Liberties Act, granting $2o,0oo to all surviving
victims of the camps and creating an educational fund accessible to the descendants of the
camps. Civil Liberties Act of 1988,50 U.S.C. app. § i989b-4 (200o).
By comparison, the Triangle Shirt Waist factory and Happyland Social Club sites were
never brought into the public domain, either physically or metaphorically, thus remaining
tragedies outside the commons.
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World War II detentions and the- detainees' deaths remained private trag-
edies, largely invisible to the public eye and unrecognized in the public
mind. Though located on federal land, and thus already in the commons
as a dejure matter, New York City's African Burial Grounds were only very
recently brought into the actual, de facto commons of public access and
consciousness through concerted lobbying efforts, principally of people of
color.
Sociologist Arnold Van Gennep, in examining separation, transition, and
incorporation rites in society, observed that burial rituals constituted not
so much separation rites from society, or even transition rites between life
stages, but, rather, incorporation rites into society.' 6' With this in mind, I
argue that the official memorialization of dead whites, whether achieved
through the setting aside of land at the World Trade Center or in the Civil
War battlefields, constitutes a rite of incorporation into the public domain
of physical access and civic consciousness. Through commemorative ritu-
als, including the invocation of dedication, eminent domain, and/or historic
preservation rules, the deaths are incorporated into the public experience
and collective memory. 62 The failure to memorialize non-white deaths
serves then to exclude, or at a minimum fails to include, these losses from
the commons of public experience, thus prohibiting their incorporation
into the wider social consciousness-into society at large, as Van Gennep
has written.' 63 In the end, the failure to treat non-whites equally reveren-
161 Van Gennep, one of the leading early theorists on totem and taboo, gave special at-
tention to rites of passage as they relate to systems of totem and taboo in indigenous cultures,
classifying these rites into three groups: those related to separation from society (e.g., sexual
maturation rites and separation of males from females); those related to transitions between
phases in society (e.g., pregnancy); and those related to incorporation into society (e.g., birth
and marriage). VAN GENNEP, supra note 7, at 146.
16z Religious studies scholar Gary Laderman argues, for example, that Lincoln sought
to establish a national cemetery at Gettysburg so that those deaths could not be forgotten.
Laderman writes, "While he may have thought that the words commemorating their strug-
gle would soon be forgotten, Lincoln realized that a national cemetery on Union soil would
inscribe their sacrifice into national space as well as collective memory," thus underscoring
the unique power of land, and its preservation through use of property law, to shape public
memory. GARY LADERMAN, THE SACRED REMAINS: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH, 1799-
1883, 126 (1996).
163 Laderman has likewise written in the religious studies literature of the government's
preservation of certain sites, but not others, on the basis of "whose significance reflects the
principles and mission of the nation." He continues:
Assuming a role once reserved for the church, the state confers im-
mortality on particular national heroes and sacraliry on specific locations
that solemnize the sacrifices and triumphs of American citizens. In addi-
tion, the maintenance of graves, museums, and memorial contributes to
the construction of sacred places on the American landscape; the cele-
bration of such national holidays as Presidents' Day, Martin Luther King
Jr. Day, and Memorial Day establishes the sacred time by which citizens
orient themselves. The cosmology of American political life is saturated
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tially in death as whites through the lesser legal, and cultural, solicitude
granted sites associated with non-white death is a tragedy visited on our
civic commons. ,64
B. Words of caution on potential dangers of asserting
the "consecrated" nature of land
This Article has noted some of the most important doctrinal and theoretical
implications of recognizing the "sacred" character of land associated with
human death and burial, a subject not previously addressed in the legal lit-
erature. In concluding, I wish to offer a few words on the potential dangers
of asserting the sacred nature of land, as when the European conquerors of
the so-called "New World" characterized their acts of "discovery" as conse-
crating the land in the name of their god (and sovereigns), thereby stripping
the land from the "godless natives" (their words) then inhabiting it.' 6s
Historian of religion Mircea Eliade, for example, celebrated colonizers'
power to consecrate land, remarking, "A territory can be made ours only
by creating it anew, that is, by consecrating it. This religious behaviour in
respect to unknown lands continued, even in the West, down to the dawn
of modern times." Citing the Spanish and Portuguese conquistadores as
examples, Eliade noted, uncritically, that they "took possession of [their
new territories] in the name of Jesus Christ," and how "[tihe raising of the
with death and the bones of the dead.
Id. at 6; see also Clark, Hands Off, supra note io, which critiques the state's disposition of dead
bodies to serve its own ends, including shaping ideas of nationalism and self-sacrifice in ser-
vice of nation.
164 If something is memorialized, then it has been incorporated into society-tragedies
"in" the commons for white deaths and not non-white.
I have tried to assemble here all the ceremonial patterns which accom-
pany a passage from one situation to another or from one cosmic or so-
cial world to another. Because of the importance of these transitions, I
think it legitimate to single out rites of passage as a special category,
which under further analysis may be subdivided into rites of separation,
transition rites, and rites of incorporation. These three subcategories are
not developed to the same extent by all peoples or in every ceremonial
pattern. Rites of separation are prominent in funeral ceremonies, rites of
incorporation at marriages. Transition rites may play an important part,
for instance, in pregnancy, betrothal, and initiation ....
VAN GENNEP, supra note 7, at io-1i.
165 Thus, for example, official recognition of land's "consecration" by the discovery,
use, and even deaths of whites is very much at issue, and on display, in Justice Marshall's
opinion in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). In a related manner, some public
officials claimed that the U.S. acquired the Micronesian territory with the dead bodies of its
soldiers, and that, having done so, the United States consecrated the soil anew. See Kathleen
M. Burch, "The U.S.A. as a Colonial Power: The Case of the State of Yap, Federated States of
Micronesia" (paper presented at the Sept. i1, 2004 Feminism and Legal Theory Workshop,
Emory Univ. Law School; copy on file with author).
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Cross was equivalent to consecrating the country, hence in some sort to a
'new birth.""'
Given the force, and currency, of such rhetoric today, with our "recon-
struction" of Iraq very much in mind, it is essential to acknowledge the
potential for abuse in asserting land's "consecration" through human death
and burial. This paper has sought to do that and, in the process, to invite
further consideration of these questions. Nevertheless, using law to recog-
nize land's consecration through association with death and burial, when
done in a non-discriminatory manner, can be a powerful tool of reparation
and empowerment, honoring and enhancing personhood.
EPILOGUE: DEATH AND BURIAL IN THE WAKE OF HURRICANE KATRINA
One need look no further than to Katrina-devastated New Orleans to see
yet another example of the failure to bring the suffering and deaths of non-
whites, principally African-Americans, into the commons of public experi-
ence. Government at all levels failed adequately to respond to this tragedy
in its immediate aftermath at least in part, I argue, because the devasta-
tion to non-whites, principally poor non-whites, was under-valued and un-
der-seen,' 67 consistent with the unconscious racism hypothesis articulated
above.' r6 Thus, as with the prior examples, it was only with significant ex-
ternal pressure that the governments proceeded to use property and other
legal rubrics to bring this tragedy into the commons.
166 Eliade, supra note 7, at 31-32. Kant, of course, rejects this colonizing and consecrat-
ing, or "reconsecrating," impulse, see, e.g., ALLEN W. WOOD, KANT 178 (2005), as do I.
167 See Wilgoren, supra note 96, at Ai (indicating 76% of those living in areas with signifi-
cant flooding were African American, and median household income of those living in affected
areas was $25,759); see also Broder, supra note 96, at A9.
168 See, e.g., Elizabeth Bumiller, Gulf Coast Isn't the Only Thing Left in Tatters; Bush's Status
with Blacks Takes a Hit, N.Y. "'TMES, Sept. I 2, 2oo5, at A 17 (reporting, "Many African-Americans
across the country said they seethed as they watched the television pictures of the largely
poor and black victims of Hurricane Katrina dying for food and water in the New Orleans
Superdome and the convention center. A poll released last week by the nonpartisan Pew
Research Center bore out that reaction as well as a deep racial divide: two-thirds of African-
Americans said the government's response to the crisis would have been faster if most of the
victims had been white, while 77 percent of whites disagreed."); see Lawrence, supra note 143
and accompanying text.
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